Daniel Morales RuvalcabaThe Mercosur bloc – comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay as full members, with Bolivia and Venezuela in special status – is at a pivotal moment as it prepares to implement its trade agreement with the European Union, effective May 1, 2026, after more than 25 years of negotiations.
This treaty will create one of the world’s largest free-trade areas.
Beyond its economic implications, Mercosur is promoting a broad geostrategic positioning amid trade tensions and transregional alliances.
The bloc has the EFTA agreement pending ratification by parliaments, is discussing the expansion of existing agreements with India, and is conducting negotiations with Canada and the United Arab Emirates.
Furthermore, it is making progress on frameworks to establish a strategic partnership with Japan and a preferential trade agreement with Vietnam, among other initiatives.
This projection makes Mercosur a key player whose influence cannot be ignored by neighbouring countries, especially the members of the Andean Community, an organisation created in 1969 and currently comprised of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
Ecuador maintains a US-oriented agenda under current President Daniel Noboa, which limits its progress toward closer ties with the South American bloc. In contrast, Bolivia is in the final stages of becoming a full member of Mercosur.
This aligns with President Rodrigo Paz’s policy of openness to the world, including a strategic approach to Washington.
This orientation is reflected in Bolivia’s participation in the Summit of the Americas and its expressed affinity for the Trump administration.
However, the situation in Colombia and Peru is more uncertain, particularly due to ongoing electoral processes, while Venezuela—suspended from Mercosur since 2016 for the breakdown of democratic order—is undergoing an exceptional transition with Delcy Rodríguez as acting president.
The outcome of these three processes is fundamental not only for the future of Mercosur, but also for South American integration as a whole and its relations with the Global South.
In this context, Washington’s growing influence is emerging as decisive, capable of actively shaping—albeit in different ways—the political and foreign policy orientations of each of these countries.
Electoral interventionism by the Trump administration
The reconfiguration of the Andean space cannot be understood without considering the role of the United States President Donald Trump, whose policy towards Latin America has ceased to operate by delegation, privileging more direct forms of pressure, in a context where involvement in internal politics and electoral processes has become increasingly explicit.
In Argentina, Trump not only openly endorsed Javier Milei and his party in the October 2025 legislative elections, but also, two weeks before the vote, conditioned US economic aid on the election results: “If he loses, we won’t be generous with Argentina,” referring to a $20 billion currency swap, adding that “if he wins, we’ll keep him, and if he doesn’t, we’ll leave.”
A similar logic was applied the following month in the Honduran presidential elections, where Trump expressed his support for Nasry Asfura on social media, stating:
“The only real friend of freedom in Honduras is Tito Asfura. Tito and I can work together,” before dismissing his main rival by declaring that “he is not a reliable partner for freedom”.
These episodes confirm that the White House no longer hides its preference for certain election outcomes: external support is not only visible but also openly performative.
Consequently, the processes in Peru and Colombia, as well as the Venezuelan transition, will depend not only on internal dynamics but also on the direct involvement of the United States.
Peru: Pragmatism and the limits of integration
Peru held its first round of presidential elections on April 12, with Keiko Fujimori leading the preliminary results from the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) with approximately 17 percent of the vote, followed by Roberto Sánchez and Rafael López Aliaga, in a highly fragmented race that will be decided in the runoff election on June 7.
More relevant than the percentages are the candidates’ profiles and their international implications.
Fujimori’s program proposes a “sovereign and pragmatic” foreign policy, balancing the United States and China without automatic alignment and emphasising the Pacific Alliance.
The absence of references to Mercosur suggests not opposition, but a different prioritisation: a trans-Pacific integration compatible with a functional relationship with Washington.
Roberto Sanchez, from a left-wing platform linked to the legacy of former president Pedro Castillo, presents a less defined foreign policy program, although clearly inscribed in a Latin Americanist tradition and in affinity with leaders such as Sheinbaum in Mexico, Lula in Brazil, Petro in Colombia and Orsi in Uruguay, which suggests a greater openness towards regional schemes such as Mercosur.
Rafael Lopez Aliaga, with a long and established career in Peruvian politics and often seen as the Peruvian Jair Bolsonaro, has cultivated close ties with figures in Trump’s circle and shows affinity with Latin American leaders of the same political persuasion, such as Javier Milei, whom he called “my brother .”
Accordingly, his foreign policy proposal focuses on strengthening ties with the United States.
The Peruvian outcome will not automatically trigger a shift towards Mercosur, but it will lead to divergent scenarios: a limited opening under Fujimori, greater regional autonomy under Sanchez, or a close alignment with Washington under Lopez Aliaga, with direct implications for South American integration and hemispheric balance.
Colombia: the turning point for Mercosur
Colombia is preparing to vote on May 31, with Ivan Cepeda, Paloma Valencia, and Abelardo de la Espriella as the leading candidates in a highly competitive race with no clear favourite heading into the June 21 runoff.
Unlike Peru, Colombia is a pivotal case, as the current government has explicitly proposed closer ties with Mercosur as part of a redefinition of its regional integration.
Cepeda represents the continuation of this orientation. While he has openly criticised Trump—saying that ” he is not a lunatic, he has a neo-fascist strategy “—his foreign policy proposal is articulated around a broader regional vocation.
In his government plan, he states that “we must contribute to strengthening a great international movement that protects Latin American sovereignty.”
However, this formulation remains at a programmatic level and does not mention Mercosur, leaving open whether this orientation would be channelled through that bloc or other regional frameworks.
In contrast, Paloma Valencia, the candidate from the main right-wing Democratic Center party, prioritises a foreign policy focused on security and investment, with a clear emphasis on strengthening relations with the United States.
She states in her government plan that “we will resume deep cooperation based on the success of Plan Colombia .”
This approach would prioritise bilateral ties with Washington over integration with South America.
Abelardo de la Espriella accentuates this trend, with a stance aligned with Trumpism: he admires the US president for his “culture war,” has praised his leadership in security, and has appealed directly to Washington to influence the Colombian electoral process, suggesting an international integration centred on the US and with little incentive to prioritise Mercosur.
Venezuela: Reintegration under uncertainty
Venezuela introduces a variable of uncertainty that could reshape the regional landscape. Unlike Peru and Colombia, there is no clear electoral calendar or certainty about which actors would compete in a context marked by institutional exceptionalism.
The continued leadership of Delcy Rodríguez, who has urged dialogue with the United States, could signal a gradual and conditional reintegration into Mercosur, subject to external pressure from the Trump administration.
In contrast, a potential opposition victory under María Corina Machado—who has ties to Washington—does not guarantee closer ties with the bloc, but rather an alignment that could shift the focus toward bilateral relations.
In this context, the leadership renewal processes in Peru, Colombia, and eventually Venezuela will define more than just governments: they will test their capacity to engage with Mercosur and strengthen regional integration, or to become subordinate to a hemispheric reconfiguration driven by Donald Trump.
Undoubtedly, this is a critical moment for the future of the Andean region.
This story was originally published on TRT Espanol
