Murat SofuogluTürkiye, a NATO member that has contributed to Europe’s defence for decades, appeared to be overlooked when Ursula von der Leyen suggested that the EU must shape its future in a way that “it does not fall under Russian, Turkish, or Chinese influence”.
The European Commission President's remark prompted senior officials in Ankara to reread her statement to fully grasp what she meant. Yet repeated readings did not change the conclusion: Türkiye, a country that has demonstrated sustained interest in joining the European club for decades, was being politically grouped alongside Russia and China, widely seen as anti-Western powers.
This interpretation prompted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to caution European leaders against misinterpreting Ankara’s ongoing interest in EU accession, emphasising that Europe should not marginalise Türkiye while continuing to depend on it for security, migration, and energy matters.
Ankara’s expanding defence capabilities underline its growing influence across several regions, from Ukraine to the Horn of Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, as Türkiye positions itself as a mediator in conflicts spanning Ukraine, Ethiopia, and the Gulf.
“Today, Europe’s need for Türkiye is greater than Türkiye’s need for Europe, and tomorrow this need will grow even more,” said the Turkish president.
“We are not a country whose existence is remembered only when needed, whose door is knocked on only in times of necessity, and which is pushed aside at other times. We are not, and never will be, such a country."
President Erdogan’s remarks refer not only to Europe’s migration challenges but also to its worsening energy crisis following the Ukraine war, which has significantly reduced Russian gas supplies. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively constrained for oil and gas trade, Europe’s energy vulnerabilities could deepen further.
Against this background, Türkiye’s position as a potential energy hub becomes more significant.
It offers one of the most viable transit routes to Europe for resources from both Central Asia and the Gulf.
Amid tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia are reportedly in discussions with Ankara to develop overland energy corridors, including pipelines that could carry oil and gas to Europe via Turkish territory.
Despite Ursula von der Leyen’s remarks, which treat Türkiye not as a partner but, at best, a competitor and, at worst, a potential adversary, experts say the EU’s mounting geopolitical challenges could ultimately force Brussels into a position where debates over Türkiye become politically irrelevant.
“If the war in Ukraine deepens and the US withdraws its support, the EU may become dependent on Türkiye, in which case I don't think the EU will consider any of its objections against Ankara as a problem. When they need to, EU criteria and everything else will be shattered,” Muzaffer Senel, an expert in European studies, tells TRT World.
After the US, Türkiye has one of the largest numbers of troops stationed beyond its borders and ranks among the countries with the most overseas military bases, with roughly one in five Turkish soldiers deployed abroad.
Over the past two decades, Türkiye has significantly strengthened its ability to conduct independent military operations.
“Apart from France, no other country in the EU has this capacity. Until the EU develops its own military capabilities independent of NATO – which doesn't seem likely in the near future – it needs Türkiye. Surveys among EU citizens revealed how reluctant Europeans are to defend their own countries,” Senel tells TRT World.
‘Exclusionary lens, not a partnership lens’
According to a 2024 Gallup International survey, only about 32 percent of EU citizens say they would be willing to fight for their country in the event of war, among the lowest regional rates globally. The figures drop to around 20 percent in countries such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
Like Senel, other experts also view von der Leyen’s approach toward Türkiye as strategically unwise given the EU’s growing list of internal and external challenges. The challenges have been showcased by Trump’s recent decision to withdraw 5,000 American soldiers from Germany.
As the EU debates “strategic autonomy” and post-Ukraine rearmament in response to increasingly adversarial positions from the Trump administration, excluding Türkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army and a unique geographic reach from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, is “strategically incoherent,” says Abdulaziz Ahmet Yasar, a Hamburg-based EU expert.
“No serious European defence architecture works without Ankara, but EU institutions struggle to admit this politically,” Yasar tells TRT World, referring to the European Commission President’s recent remark against Türkiye.
Von der Leyen’s framing “reflects a Brussels narrative” that treats Türkiye, an increasingly assertive middle power outside the EU’s normative orbit, “as a strategic competitor, regardless of NATO membership or actual alignment,” Yasar says.
“Lumping Türkiye with Russia and China is analytically lazy but politically convenient in the ‘European bubble’. It signals that the EU is consolidating internally rather than engaging externally.
“For Türkiye, it confirms what Ankara has long argued: the EU views the relationship through an exclusionary lens, not a partnership lens,” he adds.
So far, the EU’s exclusionary stance toward Türkiye has brought little benefit to Brussels. The bloc has struggled to develop a coherent security architecture, while Ankara has expanded its reach from Russia to China and North Africa, strengthening ties with non-Western groupings such as BRICS.
“Türkiye is not a country that automatically accepts EU policies while the EU wants to impose its own agenda on Ankara, which is aiming to establish a more autonomous relationship with Brussels in areas of national interest with its own agenda,” says Senel.
According to the academic, the EU does not want to see Türkiye as a co-designer on defence and security issues in regions that directly concern Ankara, such as the Black Sea and the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean.
He argues that countries like Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration, and France are effectively blocking progress within the EU on these matters when national interests are at stake.
He also notes that, within Brussels’ institutional framework, such issues are expected to be handled by the European Council, a political body comprising the heads of member states and responsible for intergovernmental relations, rather than by the European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen.
Despite this, he says, EU leadership appears to allow the Commission to take the lead in speaking on these issues.
‘Paralysis’, not ‘active rejection’
Experts point out that beyond the question of Türkiye’s membership, the EU has long struggled with a range of internal tensions, spanning enlargement policy, green energy, migration, and the question of whether to establish a European army with nuclear capabilities.
Brussels has also been grappling with a growing far-right presence in the European Parliament, which not only opposes increased migration but also rejects the idea of admitting Muslim-majority Türkiye into the EU.
Von der Leyen’s recent remarks on Türkiye can therefore be interpreted as a signal to this rising far-right, reflecting what Senel describes as a deepening “identity crisis” within the bloc.
These divisions become particularly visible in debates over Türkiye’s membership, where different EU institutions continue to express varying positions on Ankara’s accession process and its future relationship with Brussels.
In contrast to von der Leyen, EU enlargement chief Marta Kos has emphasised the importance of maintaining strong ties with Türkiye, stating that “we need Turkey [Türkiye] in light of the changing geopolitical realities in Europe and the Middle East”.
Despite Ursula von der Leyen’s harsh rhetoric toward Ankara, Türkiye continues to receive more than 60 percent of its total foreign direct investment inflows from European states, with Germany and the Netherlands leading among EU contributors.
“Some member states see strategic value in deeper cooperation on migration and defence, while others, particularly Greece, the Greek-Cypriot administration in southern Cyprus and Austria, block any meaningful rapprochement with Türkiye. The result is paralysis rather than active rejection,” Yasar tells TRT World.
While strategic logic suggests that Brussels should strengthen ties with Ankara, longstanding historical tensions and centuries of rivalry with Europe continue to shape the bloc’s approach, prompting EU leaders to adopt positions that do not fully align with the current geopolitical climate.
“Europeans psychologically find it difficult to accept Türkiye’s growing political stature, conceding its strategic and defence capabilities and ambitions,” Bulent Guven, a Hamburg-based political scientist, tells TRT World.
“The EU tends to see Türkiye not as a partner but a rival,” he says, adding that Ankara’s expanding presence in Eastern Europe, much of which has been integrated into the EU since the end of the Cold War, also contributes to unease in Brussels.
Experts also note that Türkiye’s large population of 85 million, larger than any current EU member, including Germany, would position it as a highly influential actor within the bloc, with the capacity to significantly shape decision-making processes if it were to join.
“With its current population, it is the only candidate country that has the power to fundamentally change all decision-making processes if it joins the EU,” Senel tells TRT World.
“The qualified majority voting system makes Türkiye, along with Germany, one of the strongest countries.”
