What could Evo Morales’ return mean for Bolivia?

In late September, former Bolivia President Evo Morales announced his bid to stand in the country’s 2025 presidential elections, insisting he felt obliged amid what he called “lies and sabotage” against him on X.

“They have convinced me to be a candidate. They have forced me. Of course the people want my participation but the right-wingers, the government, and the Empire are forcing me,” Morales said on his radio Kawsachun Coca program.

Reports have hinted at differences within Morales’ political party and social movement - ‘the Movement for Socialism – Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples' (MAS-IPSP), ranging from a stand-off to a deeper rift between Morales and current President Luis Arce, a former economist under Morales’ previous government.

Some have even positioned Arce and Morales as direct rivals ahead of Bolivia’s 2024 primary elections, where a candidate is put forward for the 2025 presidential elections.

However, some analysts suggest Morales’ return to Bolivia’s political landscape relates more to the direction of the MAS-IPSP and the wide-ranging sectors of society it represents.

"There are no individual rifts between Morales and Luis Arce," Jhohan Oporto PhD, professor at the Universidad Mayor de San Simon, Cochabamba in Bolivia tells TRT World.

Oporto describes an "internal reorganisation" at work within the MAS-IPSP which is made up of a "heterogenous" base of supporters including Workers, Unions, Cooperatives, Indigenous Organisations, subsistence farmers and other producers from the countryside and city, driving "a nationalist political and reformist economic program."

‘Different sociopolitical visions’

While noting Morales' strong presence in Bolivia’s political landscape since the mid-90s and a “reference” in Latin America, Oporto suggests rather than ideological or political divisions, Arce and Morales present “different sociopolitical visions,” that span the country’s diverse social and territorial divides.

Bolivia’s capital, La Paz, he explains, is largely backed by supporters of Arce and Vice President David Choquehuanca and marked by its indigenous Aymara cultural "homogeneity" and commercial ties. Conversely, the central city of Cochabamba, he argues, broadly makes up Morales’ support base which is characterised by agricultural, coca and other food production in the Chapare region, part of Bolivia’s Amazon region.

Oporto describes “the apparent contradiction” between Arce and Morales, as being “the expression of internal contradictions between factions of the party."

In 2019, despite Bolivia’s constitution stating a president can only serve two consecutive terms, Morales made a bid for a fourth consecutive term as the country’s leader.

In October 2019, after Morales won the presidential vote that was contested.

The Organization of American States (OAS) alleged irregularities had taken place while the accusation has been disputed.

Nevertheless, Morales formally stepped down on November 10, amid calls from the military to restore calm.

Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president from the Aymara community who won the 2005 presidential election, initially sought refuge in Mexico and then Argentina after a change in government.

Some who succeeded Morales resigned and fled, allowing opposition figure Jeanine Anez, then vice-president of the senate and the highest ranking official remaining to take over as leader of Bolivia.

On November 23, both Chambers of Congress approved a bill to nullify the presidential vote, pushing for new elections without Morales.

After assuming power, Anez called the security forces to restore order with the post-election conflict resulting in around 35 deaths and has since faced accusations of "genocide."

Following her interim presidential tenure, Anez was arrested in March 2021, accused of irregularly assuming the presidency.

In June 2022 Anez was sentenced to 10 years in jail over what prosecutors say was a coup to oust her predecessor Morales - a ruling she rejects, insisting her tenure was part of "a constitutional succession due to electoral fraud."

Nevertheless, Anez was found guilty of "decisions contrary to the constitution," although she calls the charges a political vendetta.

After the sociopolitical turmoil, after Arce won the election in October 2020, Morales returned to Bolivia.

A divisive figure

However, Morales remains a divisive figure in the country, following his presidential legacy and exit from office.

“Morales was president of Bolivia for more than a decade, one of the longest-serving presidents in Bolivian history. He also ran for four consecutive terms, despite a constitution that limited presidents to two terms in office,” Miguel Centellas, Croft Instructional Associate Professor of Sociology & International Studies at the University of Mississippi tells TRT World.

“During that time, he maintained a tight control over his party (MAS) and limited the potential for internal rivals. It would seem that Morales wants to return to Bolivia and wield power, rather than as an “elder statesman,” argues Centellas.

A 2019 TRT World report found Bolivia was deeply polarised between whether what the country experienced was a popular uprising or a coup. Some regarded ousted President Morales as a champion of the indigenous and downtrodden while others viewed him an autocrat in the making.

Nevertheless, Morales maintained that what took place in 2019 after the presidential elections was a US-backed right-wing coup plot.

“It was a national and international coup d’etat,” Morales told AFP in Argentina’s capital Buenos Aires while in exile and claiming asylum. “Industrialised countries don’t want competition.”

Morales accused Washington of not having “forgiven” Bolivia for adopting lithium extraction cooperation-partnerships with Russia and China instead of the US.

“That’s why I’m absolutely convinced it’s a coup against lithium,” he said.

Ahead of Bolivia’s presidential election in 2025, Oporto believes lithium development will likely be a determining factor for the MAS-IPSP.

He suggests new wealth generated from this industry would potentially permit the government to undertake a “new cycle of public policies” oriented towards the working class sectors.

​​During his presidential tenure, Morales nationalised gas and oil sectors, adopting market friendly policies while amid high commodity prices, the State invested in social welfare programs, raising more than a million out of poverty.

MAS-IPSP without Morales as President

Yet in October 2020, after assuming office, President Arce appeared to float another vision with a different role for Morales while acknowledging him as an “undisputed and historic leader” who has led a process of change and been an international leader.

"But what is certain is that he (Morales) will have no involvement in the government; he has his role as president of MAS, which is extremely important. During this time we have realised that we failed to strengthen the entities with the MAS itself,” he told El Pais.

Arce added that the former coca farmer turned politician could contribute to the government’s relations with social organisations while also acknowledging his legal troubles.

“We don't see that what comrade Evo might do or say is going to affect us. What we do and don't do, the mistakes we make, that's what can affect us. The ball is in our court," added Arce.

In the last two decades the MAS-IPSP has "monopolised” political discussions in Bolivia, explains Oporto, describing politics outside of the sociopolitical movement as largely "peripheral," particularly relating to alternative discussions beyond a plurinational state, nationalisation, industrialisation.

Oporto outlines largely how in Bolivia, there are two main schools of thought in the country, should the MAS-IPSP continue in power. He suggests the opposition would decry that they are experiencing a so-called "MAS dictatorship" while supporters of the MAS-IPSP would contend Bolivia is on track to recover the socioeconomic dynamism from 2006-2015.

From 2006 figures for those living in poverty stood at 59.9% and fell to 34.6% by 2017 while extreme poverty more than halved in the same period.

In 2009, during Morales’ tenure Bolivia became a plurinational state, advancing indigenous rights relating to collective and land titling, with prior consultation on development projects and intercultural education.

Although opinion regarding Morales varies among Bolivia’s 36 different indigenous peoples, particularly in relation to the government's plan to develop a highway through the TIPNIS indigenous reserve - resulting in protests in 2011 - both for and against the proposal.

Deep polarisation

Nevertheless, Centellas notes how by 2019, Bolivia had “already deeply polarised between pro- and anti-Morales camps. The MAS party had been so thoroughly identified with Morales, that this became the central division. Under Luis Arce, MAS has the potential of becoming an institutionalised (rather than personalised) political party, and could realign Bolivian politics into ideological (rather than personalist) divisions.”

If Morales regains control of the MAS-IPSP, he suggests the same kind of polarisation will likely continue as before although “Morales would no longer dominate the political landscape like he did after 2009, which could make a MAS electoral victory less certain”.

Ahead of the 2025 presidential elections, Centellas believes much will depend on how the opposition responds, suggesting they have failed to “create an institutionalised, programmatically driven party that challenges MAS.”

“Opposition leaders have often focused on Morales, further personalising the political landscape, and squabbled over themselves, fragmenting the opposition vote and ensuring MAS majorities or even supermajorities,” adds Centellas.

While Morales has stated his intention to run, Arce's Justice Minister Ivan Lima announced Bolivia's Constitutional Court must decide if Morales can run again for a potentially fourth term as president after Arce's 5 year presidential tenure.

Amid the different sociopolitical visions presented by the MAS-IPSP, Oporto argues it is unknown how the situation will finally end.

He suggests the different possibilities range from the imposition of the La Paz bloc, or the Cochabamba bloc, to a "schism" of the MAS-IPSP or a potential union between both blocs that includes their leadership.

He views the latter to be "the most likely scenario," and despite potential adjustments and deals having to be struck, he views that Morales would most likely be first in line for the MAS-IPSP.