A new axis: Syria and Ukraine unite after Assad's fall

The collapse of any country's government can drastically change international relationships. A striking recent example is the evolving relationship between Syria and Ukraine following the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime last month.

In 2022, Syria decided to be one of the few countries to recognise the "independence" of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In response, Kiev quickly severed diplomatic relations with Damascus. However, Ukraine sent its top diplomat to Syria within a few weeks of Assad's regime collapsing. Now the two countries are speaking about establishing a "strategic" partnership.

On December 30, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Vitaliy Koval led a delegation to Damascus for talks with high-ranking officials in Syria's new government, including its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and newly appointed Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani. That day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared on X, "We support the Syrian people in overcoming decades of dictatorial rule and restoring stability, security, and normal life in Syria."

Post-Assad Syria and Ukraine are determined to forge strong relations, which is understandable considering the geopolitical dynamics that give the current leaders in Damascus and Kiev some common cause.

Military ties

Currently, the "new Syria" and Ukraine mostly provide each other with moral support.

Nonetheless, there is potential for Syrian-Ukrainian military cooperation that could serve both countries' interests in practical ways, even if a formal military alliance is unlikely to take shape in the immediate future.

After all, last year Kiev helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—the dominant group in a coalition of factions that recently toppled the Assad government, and which is now the main actor in Syria's current government. Ukrainian intelligence operatives provided HTS with drones shortly before the 11-day campaign began in Idlib. That military support from Kiev played a "modest role" in toppling the Assad regime, according to Western intelligence sources.

Zelenskyy's government could possibly expand on its military cooperation with HTS that began in the short period leading up to the Assad government’s fall last month. But at least in the upcoming period such cooperation would be more in the form of technical support since Kiev needs all the hardware it can produce and import.

Noting that the majority of Syria's military equipment is of Soviet/Russian origin, Wolfgang Pusztai, a senior adviser at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, told TRT World that Ukraine would also be "able to provide spares and maintenance support for most of these weapons and other equipment."

Food security

As the world's fourth most food-insecure country, Syria suffers from extreme hunger and poverty. Establishing a trade partnership with Ukraine, a major wheat exporter, could thus be critical.

Although not formally extended, the Black Sea Grain Initiative remains unofficially in effect, allowing Ukraine to export wheat abroad via the Black Sea. Ukrainian exports to Syria could pave the way for a much deeper partnership in the future.

Without Russia attacking Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea or seeking to inflict serious damage on Ukraine’s port infrastructure, the Ukrainians can freely use the body of water for trade. Consequently, Ukraine’s wheat exports to Syria will be possible without any obstruction by Moscow.

With an economy which depends on food exports, it was extremely important to Ukraine that the Black Sea routes reopened. Therefore, establishing trade relations with post-Assad Syria will serve the Eastern European country’s key economic security interests.

In fact, three days before Sybiha and Koval came to Damascus late last year, Ukraine sent Syria 500 tons of wheat flour. Now there is a serious possibility that Ukraine will replace Russia as Syria's top food supplier, especially of wheat.

"In 2024, Ukraine exported about 12 million tons of wheat. Before the war in 2021, the figure was at 18.84 million tons. This means, it should be possible for Ukraine to replace Russian wheat for Syria, even if the war continues," Pusztai said.

However, despite Ukraine having the capacity to export wheat to Syria on a large scale, there are some obstacles. For starters, Syria and Ukraine are both cash-strapped. Syria does not have the money to purchase Ukraine's wheat, and Ukraine does not have the luxury of giving Syria free aid.

Perhaps a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar could step in to facilitate Ukrainian wheat exports to Syria. This potential "win-win" scenario could result in a Gulf Arab monarchy shoring up the new Damascus government, enabling it to take on Syria's food security crisis. At the same time, this would put hard cash in Ukraine's hands, which the war-torn Eastern European country needs.

Geopolitical considerations

While analysing the establishment of a Syria-Ukraine partnership, it is necessary to consider the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and how Kiev, Moscow, Western capitals, and post-Assad Damascus fit into the picture.

"For Ukraine, this is about weakening Russia's global standing and showing the US, NATO, and the EU, that Kiev can help undermine Russian influence in a region crucial to global energy markets and European security–including Ukraine's own security," Ferial Saeed, a former senior American diplomat, told TRT World.

This brings us to Russia's role in the "New Syria". An unknown factor is how HTS authorities will manage Damascus's relationship with Moscow. It is safe to assume that the post-Baathist government will not be as close to the Kremlin as Syria was under the Assad family.

However, a possible continuation of Western sanctions on Damascus and the Western governments' terrorist designations of HTS could, at least to some degree, push al-Sharaa's government into Russia's arms.

Mindful of the de facto Syrian ruler's remarks about Russia being an "important country" that shares "deep strategic interests" with Syria, and how the new Damascus government does "not want Russia to leave Syria in the way that some wish," the idea of Syrian-Russian relations continuing to be somewhat strong in the post-Assad era is not unthinkable.

For now, a key question relates to what will happen to Russia's military presence in Syria. Some Ukrainian figures call for their country to usurp control of each Russian military position in Syria, which in practice would result in Kiev having a military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Yet, whether this has any chance of actually happening is another question. In any event, if the Russians have to shut down their military installations in post-Assad Syria, the leadership in Kiev will be in a position to take some degree of credit for that outcome and try to convince American and European statesmen that Ukraine’s “strategic” relationship with Damascus helped achieved something geopolitically significant in the Middle East in alignment with western interests. In doing so, Kiev could possibly strengthen its bid for eventual EU and NATO membership.

Future opportunities

In the long term, Syria and Ukraine could cooperate in education, energy, technology, and reconstruction. Ukraine's expertise in agricultural technology, particularly irrigation and hydraulic engineering, could be vital for Syria's recovery, with Ukrainian companies finding investment opportunities in Syria's reconstruction efforts.

The Ukrainians could also play an important role in Syria’s sectors like power grid maintenance and oil infrastructure considering how many of these facilities are based on technology from the Soviet Union/Russia.

Nonetheless, for now, the most valuable thing that Syria could do to help Ukraine advance its own interests would be for Damascus to sever relations with Moscow and undermine Russia’s means to project hard-power beyond the former Soviet space.

This would help accomplish what officials in Zelenskyy's government want, which is for Russia to have fewer supporters on the international stage. Thus, Assad's fall late last year has the potential to change Damascus-Moscow relations in ways that serve Ukraine's agenda—not only in weakening Russian clout but also helping Kiev make inroads in the Arab world and other regions outside the West.

"Syria matters in the Middle East, so the relationship is a platform for building broader ties with states in a critical region, whose support may become more crucial to Ukraine in the future,” said former US diplomat Saeed, adding "the symbolism of both Syria and Ukraine fighting Russian interference and aggression could potentially help Kiev in the Global South."