How will the EU navigate a defence future without US guarantees?

European countries are confronting a disorienting new reality as longstanding assumptions about their relationship with their primary military guarantor fade into the dark.

In a tumultuous week for Europe, the Trump administration announced plans to pursue direct peace talks with Russia in Saudi Arabia—without a seat for Ukraine or the presence of European Union officials—sending shockwaves through European capitals.

On February 17, a day before US President Donald Trump announced the meeting, European leaders convened an emergency summit in Paris, calling for increased defence spending to ramp up the continent’s military capabilities.

It was a necessary acknowledgement that Europe had been left to fend for itself. Trump made it crystal clear that his priorities do not lie in defending Europe or maintaining global security but in securing financial leverage.

During a Fox News interview on February 10, he openly demanded a $500 billion “payback” from Ukraine in the form of “rare earth” minerals as compensation for US financial support in Kiev’s defence against Russia.

“They [Ukraine] may make a deal. They may not make a deal. They may be Russian someday, or they may not be Russian someday. But we’re going to have all this money in [Ukraine], and I say, I want it back,” Trump said.

Trump claimed the US had already invested $300 billion in the war, adding that Ukraine had agreed to the payback “so at least we don’t feel stupid.”

Europe’s historic reliance on US

Since the end of World War II, Europe has depended on the United States for security and defence.

The creation of NATO in 1949 cemented US' role as Europe’s primary military protector, particularly against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

US military bases across the continent, along with its nuclear umbrella, ensured European security, allowing European nations to focus on economic growth and integration without the burden of spending significantly on defence.

The relationship endured despite occasional tensions, such as disagreements over the Vietnam War, the 2003 Iraq invasion, and trade policies.

However, US leadership in NATO remained largely unquestioned, with successive American administrations, both Republican and Democrat, reaffirming their commitment to European security.

Even after the Soviet collapse, NATO expanded, reinforcing the belief that America’s security guarantee was permanent.

Trump’s abrupt shift has upended this assumption.

Even before his first term, then-candidate Trump questioned NATO allies’ financial commitments, suggesting a re-evaluation of US involvement if member nations did not meet their defence spending obligations.

This rhetoric translated into policy actions.

In 2020, Secretary of Defence Mark Esper announced the withdrawal of approximately 12,000 American military personnel from Germany, with Trump declaring that Germany was “delinquent” in its defence spending.

“NATO is very important. But NATO is helping Europe more than it’s helping us. At the same time, it’s very good for us,” Trump said during a press conference following the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018, during his first term.

Despite rhetorical affirmations of support, the Biden administration also took a cautious approach to Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials were often frustrated by the slow pace and limited scope of US military aid. Nevertheless, the US remained a key defence provider.

Trump’s approach, however, marks an unprecedented departure from past transatlantic relations.

No postwar American president has so openly questioned NATO’s value, framed alliances in purely transactional terms, or signalled such a willingness to move away from European security commitments.

“The Trump administration seems determined to pull the US back from its alliances with European countries and play a smaller role in defence of Europe,” says Giorgio Cafiero, political analyst. He cautioned that this could give Russia significant leverage over key strategic decisions.

“We know that Russia is always determined to exploit any weaknesses and divisions within the NATO alliance. And I am sure that the Kremlin is definitely pleased to see European states feeling very nervous about the foreign policy decisions being made by the Trump administration,” the CEO of a US-based geopolitical risk consulting firm, told TRT World.

Cafiero also noted that tensions between the US and the European Union might create a void for other global powers—most notably China—to increase their influence in Europe.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and other EU officials, expressing China’s willingness to enhance cooperation with Europe on free trade and multilateralism.

“I certainly do not think it’s a coincidence that this Chinese outreach came in the aftermath of these recent developments between the Trump administration and Washington’s allies in Europe,” Cafiero said.

He suggested that in the grand scheme of things, Trump may be retrenching resources from Europe to focus on long-term strategic challenges posed by China.

This stance has many supporters among senior officials at the US Department of Defence, including Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who argue that the US lacks the capacity to sustain a two-front war against Russia and China.

‘Attack on one, attack on all’

The coming months will determine whether Europe can adapt to a new geopolitical reality.

Experts say that European leaders must decide whether they can afford to remain dependent on America—whose decisions could have existential consequences.

A recently released Danish intelligence report reinforces these concerns.

“Russia is likely to be more willing to use military force in a regional war against one or more European NATO countries if it perceives NATO as militarily weakened or politically divided,” states the report, dated February 9.

“This is particularly true if Russia assesses that the US cannot or will not support European NATO countries in a war with Russia,” it adds.

Russia is already expanding its military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO, according to the report.

Other questions Europe faces

Europe must now grapple with urgent decisions: how to sustain Ukraine’s war effort, how to strengthen its own defences, and how to redefine its relationship with the US.

The continent still holds some leverage.

European countries control most of the frozen Russian assets that will be part of any eventual settlement with Moscow.

They have also been among Russia’s biggest energy customers, and though pressure to resume purchases of cheap Russian gas is mounting—especially in Germany’s election debate—it can act as a bargaining tool.

Yet Europe’s ability to shape the conflict’s outcome is constrained by America’s stance.

Washington has made clear that it will not enforce any ceasefire line between Ukraine and Russia, effectively leaving European nations to shoulder the burden of guaranteeing Ukraine’s long-term security.