Zelenskyy called Europe's defence ‘weak’. How did it get there?

Today, Americans and Russians met in Saudi Arabia for talks over a peace deal in Ukraine, in which Ukrainian representatives were missing. Additionally, the absence of a European delegation made it more conspicuous.

At a moment of deep geopolitical uncertainty, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has offered a scathing assessment of Europe’s defence capabilities: “weak.”

“Readiness has increased,” he conceded, but in terms of sheer force— “the number of combat troops, the fleet, the air force, the drones… I honestly think that Europe is weak today.”

It is a blunt remark, but one that invites a pertinent question: How did Europe, once the dominant force in global affairs, get here?

For centuries, European empires projected their power across the globe, exercising direct or indirect control over 84 percent of the world, casting influence over those areas where it didn’t directly rule.

Today, that influence has faded. It has been replaced by a pattern of inaction, hesitation, and a codependent reliance on the United States.

The Balkans in the 1990s, Syria in the 2010s, and the current war in Ukraine—time and again, Europe has struggled to assert itself, often waiting for Washington to step in. Its response to the Israel-Palestine conflict has been similarly disjointed, and as Trump administration 2.0 takes charge and action around the world, the continent finds itself bracing for uncertainty yet again.

The question, then, is not just why Europe is weak, but whether it is a matter of weak will, innovation, co-dependence on Washington or something more structural?

Gas dilemma

One answer lies in energy.

For all Europe’s issues with Russia, it still receives nearly 20 percent of its liquefied natural gas from Moscow, and efforts to wean itself completely off haven’t borne the expected fruition.

Over the last six decades, Europe has steadily increased its dependence on Russian gas, building a complex web of pipelines that ultimately forced Europe into an awkward position when the Russo-Ukrainian conflict began.

As the war escalated, Europe found itself in a rock and a hard place: sanctioning the very nation that supplied its energy, while paying out an estimated 204 billion euros for Russian gas.

The Nord Stream pipeline, once a symbol of economic pragmatism, became a geopolitical noose.

Europe’s economy has no doubt been hit by an additional factor. The Covid-19 pandemic-induced slowdown was bad, but the added strain of energy uncertainty has only deepened Europe’s quandary.

Industrial production fell between November and December 2024—dipped by 1.1 percent in the eurozone and 0.8 percent in the wider EU.

It hit ordinary Europeans directly who now have shouldered the higher consumer prices that costlier gas brings, eroding household budgets and fuelling discontent.

The economic consequences of the confluence have been severe.

Precarity of single market

Then there is the lack of economic cohesion, which is fuelled by the myth of a single market: great on paper, but tricky in Europe.

On paper, the European Union boasts a single market, a seamless flow of goods, services, capital, and people. In reality, national policies and bureaucratic barriers stifle that promise.

As Erik Jones and Matthias Matthijs wrote in Foreign Affairs, “National rules regarding income taxation, pension funds, risk absorption, and bankruptcy proceedings make it unattractive for investors to look beyond the boundaries of their own countries to the rest of Europe. As a result, much of Europe’s savings either sits idle in domestic banks or chases higher returns in the deeper, more liquid capital markets in the United States.”

The economic stagnation is matched by a lag in innovation and technology.

While still a powerhouse in automation and industrialisation, the continent is no match for the United States, the home of Artificial Intelligence, robotics, and Big Tech.

After centuries of colonisation and extracting wealth from the world, Europe is now struggling to find its political, economic and security footing and, some may even argue, relevance, in a rapidly developing world and a shifting global economy.

For Washington, this lack of urgency has not gone unnoticed.

US Vice President JD Vance chided the Europeans at the Munich Security Conference when he said, “We also believe that it’s important in the coming years for Europe to step up in a big way to provide for its own defence.”

Does that signal the patience of the US with Europe wearing thin?

Declining role in global security

European ambivalence and inaction have played out in war zones across the decades. The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The Syrian crisis. The repeated failures to broker peace between Israel and Palestine or even how to deal with the new US administration.

Underscoring this weakness has been its codependent relationship with the US, with Washington readily bailing the continent out of trouble throughout much of modern history with initiatives such as the Marshall Plan.

Then there are divisions over how to handle Russia.

The Russo-Ukrainian war right within Europe’s borders has split the continent on its strategic responses, but it has also made it an uncertain and hesitant partner for Ukraine.

Even within NATO, European nations have often struggled to align on strategy, let alone on military spending. Trump has made it a point to chastise Europe on its low defence spending in NATO, but Europe simply cannot afford it.

As Germany agitated on sending Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, Kiev was instead forced to rest heavily on the US’s shoulders – a European pattern that has contributed to the Trump administration eschewing European input when negotiating with Russia.

The Trump administration has often bypassed Europe altogether in negotiations with Russia, as seen in Washington’s latest push for a Ukraine peace summit in Saudi Arabia—conspicuously lacking European representation.

Gen. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, made the reasoning explicit: “I don’t think it’s reasonable and feasible to have everybody sitting at the table.”

The unspoken subtext: Europe’s presence is not essential.

This brings us back to Zelenskyy’s comments – that Europe’s defence is weak.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has laid bare Europe’s vulnerabilities: a sluggish economy, a fragmented defence industry and decreasing production.

Recent global events, declining economic growth and a series of questionable choices have pigeon-holed Europe into a tight spot. Either it will seize this moment as a wake-up call or fade into geopolitical irrelevance.