How the fall of Assad impacts Russia in Ukraine and elsewhere

Russia’s involvement in Syria began in September 2015, a year after Moscow-backed rebels carved out breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine. But so much has changed since then in both Ukraine and Syria that many experts are now questioning whether Russia’s options on its Middle Eastern flank have been severely limited with the end of the Assad regime.

Unlike in 2015, when the Kremlin deployed heavy weaponry and fighter jets to save Assad from a certain defeat, this time the longtime Syrian dictator found himself alone while the revolutionary forces closed in on Damascus in an 11-day lightning offensive.

“The fall of Bashar al Assad is negative for Russia,” says Sergei Markov, a former advisor to President Vladimir Putin. “First of all, for nearly a decade, Russia had spent a lot of resources to save Bashar al Assad. Second, hundreds of Russian troops were killed in Syria fighting to support him. Of course this is a failure for Russia,” Markov tells TRT World.

Washington Post columnist David Ignatius reported that shortly before the Syrian opposition offensive started against the Assad regime, “Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones” to Idlib, the main bastion of the leading opposition group HTS. Ignatius wrote that Ukraine wanted to “bloody Russia’s nose and undermine its clients.”

Markov said Russian influence across the Middle East will diminish in light of its failure in Syria, a client state where Moscow had kept military bases along the Mediterranean ports ever since the Soviet times.

Russia’s losses will not be limited to the Middle East, Markov adds, arguing that Moscow will lose significant prestige from the Central African Republic to Mali and Burkina Faso, where it has military presence to support respective governments, and all the way to Central Asia where it has provided security guarantees to former Soviet republics through The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Russia is trying to broker a deal with the new transitional Syrian government to keep its bases in the Mediterranean coast. But if Moscow can’t continue to operate its assets in the region, it complicates the Kremlin’s access to Africa, according to Markov, who added that bases such as the Hmeimim airbase is a critical focal point connecting Russia with its military missions in African countries.

But the Russian political scientist believes that the fall of the Assad regime is a greater failure for Tehran than Moscow due to Iran’s long sectarian and political ties with the former ruling family, a faithful of Alawites, a branch linked to Shia Muslim understanding.

For Markov, Assad dug his own grave by refusing to normalise relations with Türkiye and rejecting the long standing demand of forming an inclusive government.

Ukraine repercussions

Now that Assad fled to Russia along with his family, he leaves behind a dark legacy of corruption, torture, massacres and systemic oppression.

His end will also leave a significant impact on the Ukraine war, says Markov.

From a military perspective, he says, it will have a positive impact because Russia will be released from its Syria burdens, and align itself with the thoughts of many ordinary Russians who believe that Ukraine should be the top priority for Moscow due to the former’s deep historical and cultural ties with Russia.

But in terms of economics, the Syrian failure can hit Russian finances, he says, referring to how some countries under Russian security guarantees might have second-thoughts on circumventing Western sanctions on the Kremlin after the fall of Bashar al Assad.

In view of the Syria setback, Russia’s middle power allies might be less willing to “violate Western sanctions” in return of Russian security guarantees, adding strains to Moscow’s Ukraine war effort, says Markov.

The Syria debacle can exact a bigger cost for Russia, according to Markow, especially because it could make Moscow appear “weak” in the eyes of the incoming Trump administration, which aims to mediate a “compromise” between Russia and Ukraine.

Trump, as per Markow, can exploit this perceived weak spot in the Russian geopolitical maneuvering, motivating him to play hard ball with the Kremlin.

“Instead of reaching a compromise with Russia, Western countries might increase pressure” over the Kremlin, using forceful measures to make the Russian military falter in Ukraine and “the political regime of Vladimir Putin show its weakness”, according to Markov.

“So the fall of Assad might lead to increasing Western aggression against Russia in Ukraine.”

Eugene Chausovsky, a defence expert and a senior director on analytical development and training at New Lines Institute, also views that the fall of Assad could have a significant impact on the diplomatic dimension of the Ukraine war.

While Russia’s recent military gains in Ukraine, along with Trump’s intentions to pressure Kiev in order to strike a deal to end the conflict early on in his term, have given the diplomatic advantage to Russia, Moscow suffered a major loss to its diplomatic prestige and potentially to its military positions in Syria, Chausovsky tells TRT World.

As “the unpredictable consequences of Assad’s defeat throughout the region” reverberates, the fall of the Syrian regime “could potentially deprive Moscow of some of its leverage in negotiations with the US over the Ukraine conflict,” he says.

But Oleg Ignatov, a senior analyst on Russia at the International Crisis Group, does not think the fall of Assad will have an impact on the war in Ukraine, which is “an absolute priority for Putin.” In the Russian leader’s worldview, the Ukraine war is “an existential conflict from which Moscow cannot withdraw without achieving its goals,” Ignatov tells TRT World.

Can Russia stay in Syria?

Russia's main interest in Syria will now remain on keeping its naval base safe, according to Ignatov.

“It is the only Russian naval base not only in the Mediterranean, but also abroad. It is of strategic importance to the Russian navy. The likelihood that Russia will also retain its airbase is not great, in my opinion,” he says, adding “Russia has nothing to offer the new authorities.”

According to Chausovsky, Russia “appears to be maneuvering to try to maintain its military presence” in Syria, retaining “some form of influence - no matter which future government emerges there.”

It’s not clear Russia can keep its bases in Syria, says Markov, adding that its military presence in the Middle Eastern country is not “welcomed” by the new transitional government in Damascus. But he sees that even if Russians are not welcomed, they can still keep their bases as the US has had its army base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, a communist state.

According to Markov, Russia forced Bashar al Assad to leave Damascus without any violence during the 11-day opposition mayhem and the former regime leader complied with the Kremlin’s demand, departing the country for Moscow. As a result, Russia played a good role in the peaceful transfer of power, he says.

He also draws attention to Russia playing a “positive role” in terms of power transfer in Afghanistan and holding talks with the Taliban, which has some connections with Syrian opposition groups. Russia can use these experiences with groups like the Taliban to develop ties with the current Syrian government, he says.

Russia also has a good partnership with Türkiye, a country with a powerful influence over the new Syrian government, which might “help for the formation of more positive relationships” between Moscow and Damascus, he says.