Incapacity, negligence and failure: What Israeli army's Oct 7 probe reveals

A recent report by the Israeli army has said that the first hours of the Hamas-led incursion on October 7 were a military failure of the highest level due to the lack of an effective response, poor conflict management, and insufficient protection afforded to its own citizens.

The report, published in mid-July, is an extensive investigation into what happened on the day of the incursion in Kibbutz Be'eri, located 5 kilometres east of Gaza.

More than nine months after Israel launched a brutal war on Gaza following the Hamas attack, the Israeli army appears to have tacitly admitted that it failed in delivering the most basic service of a military force - that is, tackling external threats.

The report strikingly proves that the Israeli army, one of the biggest recipients of military aid in the world, could only reach the area controlled by Hamas fighters seven hours after the incursion began.

While the report attempts to justify this failure by citing simultaneous attacks and blocked access roads, it also admits that the Israeli forces waited outside the area after their arrival without engaging with the intruders till the afternoon.

Paralysed situation

The probe revealed that Israeli forces suffered from a severe lack of command and control, coordination, and order among the different units, which left them in a paralysed situation.

"Some forces did not enter the fight because of a command decision to wait in order to evacuate civilians from Kibbutz Be'eri, forces that were fighting exited the kibbutz based on a command decision, forces that entered after about an hour because they were waiting for the force commander, and other forces that were outside the community in order to set up a perimeter," the report states.

Regarding the findings of the report, Israeli military experts highlight that the General Staff primarily failed, especially regarding the defence strategy and particularly intelligence warnings.

"These issues should have been investigated and presented to the public long before the Be'eri incident," said Yossi Yehoshua, military commentator for Israel's Yedioth Ahronoth daily.

He also pointed out that Israeli army Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram, the commander of Division 99 who was in charge of operations in Kibbutz Be'eri on October 7, are also seen as the primary reasons for the failure.

"The Chief of Staff failed here much more than Barak Hiram, and now he must decide what is happening here."

Hannibal at Pessi Cohen case?

Widely debated in the Israeli media, the issue of misconduct by the army against Israeli citizens is just glossed over in the report. While it mentions instances where soldiers acted inappropriately, the report only claims that these were mainly "in the security provided to the residents that were evacuated, and in addressing the basic needs by the security forces."

In this regard, the report addresses the hostage-taking incident at the home of Pessi Cohen in the area where 13 of the 14 hostages were killed.

Describing it as a "unique" and "isolated" case, the army report claims that the tank shot fired towards the house to supposedly flush out Palestinian fighters "was carried out professionally."

However, just before the report was published, Haaretz reported that the Israeli army implemented the Hannibal Directive on October 7, aimed at preventing Hamas from taking soldiers captive.

The directive, which is controversial and often criticised, allows for extreme measures to avoid the capture of soldiers, even if it risks their lives. Regarding the Pessi Cohen case, the Israeli media outlet cited Hiram's interview with the New York Times to reveal that he ordered the Hannibal procedure.

Speaking to TRT World, Middle East expert Haydar Oruc says the report could be a strategic move by the Israeli army, which has acknowledged a partial failure but is trying to cover up the implementation of the Hannibal Directive on October 7.

"Given the sensitivity of Israeli society to hostages and the government's dislike of exchanging many Palestinian prisoners for a few hostages, admitting to such a protocol would be devastating for both the government and the army," he said.

Untold parts

While the report's findings are revealing, what is interesting is what it does not address.

Despite the perfunctory confession of failures in many areas, the report avoids addressing specific intelligence lapses that led to the surprise and scale of the attack. It is also silent on comprehensive accountability for specific individuals or units responsible for the failures.

For this reason, the report inevitably leaves critical aspects of the incident unaddressed, demonstrating a significant lack of transparency.

For example, some of the names within the team reported in the Israeli media, such as Colonel (res.) Yossi Turgeman and Anat Sten are not mentioned in the official text of the Israeli army.

When other members of the investigative group were further checked, two of them raised more questions in this regard. For instance, the chief of the group, Maj. Gen. (res.) Mickey Edelstein is known for his failure to provide evidence regarding allegations of rape by Hamas fighters during the incursion, only telling reporters, "We cannot share it," and declining to elaborate further.

Another member of the team is Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Dr. Oded Megiddo, whose political stance is publicly known. Megiddo, a 74-year-old veteran who fought in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, has been actively participating in anti-government protests in the country for almost two years.

"The country has turned upside down," he once said, decrying the government for its judicial overhaul plan and criticising its cabinet ministers, some of whom he described as "convicted criminals" and "corrupt."

Highlighting the role of the investigation team, Oruc claims that even though the report should have been technical, it falls short of identifying the failure's culprits and focuses on general advice to field commanders during crises.

"Such a failure should hold both the army and the government accountable, but the report aims to divert public reaction away from the government," he said.

Future implications

With this report, Israel will confront two challenges: First, the failures and lack of professionalism within the Israeli army will force the country's security establishment to implement drastic changes and reforms, particularly in the ground forces and reservists.

Considering the accumulating failures in Gaza, as the Israeli media have uncovered based on personal testimonies of soldiers, such groundbreaking efforts might arise even before the war in Gaza ends.

Second, this report will also inflame tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right allies and the anti-Netanyahu security establishment network.

Pro-Netanyahu Telegram channels harshly criticised the report's findings, demanding Chief of Staff Halevi's resignation. At the same time, Israeli media previously reported that during a security cabinet meeting on June 28, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also holds the Defense Minister's portfolio for the occupied West Bank, lashed out at Halevi, saying, "We are as committed to security as you are. (...) It wasn't us who went to sleep on October 6."

On top of that, history might repeat itself in Israel after 51 years. As the similarities between October 7 and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War are widely discussed, after this report, we might see a similar chain of events to what happened in the aftermath of the 1973 war.

Back then, the Agranat Commission, chaired by then-Chief Justice Simon Agranat, recommended the immediate dismissal of several high-ranking officers, including top generals of the army and its intelligence units, for failing to predict the Egyptian and Syrian offensives.

However, the commission exempted then-Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan from any responsibility for the war, which led to a series of demonstrations organised by reservist army officers, culminating in Meir's resignation.

Following that resignation, the historic 1977 elections took place, which shook the Israeli political landscape to its foundations.

If the debate around this report continues to grow, a similar recurrence of history is very much possible.