Manila's missile strategy is a defence against aggression, not an arms race

Maritime tensions are rising in the South China Sea, as the Philippines moves forward with plans to purchase a mid-range Typhon missile system from the United States.

China appears visibly alarmed by the decision. In recent weeks, Beijing has accused Manila of placing its national security considerations in the hands of Washington, and also warned Manila against stoking an "arms race" in Southeast Asia.

In Washington's view, the Philippines' proximity to Taiwan also opens up the possibility of future missile deployments in what China sees as dangerously close range.

Both China and the Philippines have been clashing over rights to the South China Sea – a critical global trade seaway.

China claims control over almost all of the sea, though the Permanent Court of Arbitration - a non-United Nations intergovernmental organisation - found "no legal basis" for Beijing's assertions in 2016.

Manila views this ruling as confirmation of its own sovereign rights, and sees the new missile system - which is capable of hitting targets in China - as critical to its territorial and maritime defense.

Maritime tensions have surged in recent months as both sides accuse each other of breaching territorial waters, raising fears of violent confrontations and future escalation.

So is Manila's pursuit of the US Typhon system really self-defence, or part of a broader US effort to prepare against a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan?

Mustering resolve

Considering Manila's desire to boost its deterrence capabilities, the system should help with the country's self-defence.

Filipino forces are already familiar with the system and have experience training with it. It has been deployed for months as part of joint military exercises with the US, and serves as an important contributor to Manila's Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence (CAD) strategy, a defence plan that puts a premium on safeguarding Manila's maritime interests.

China already has a significant missile strike advantage, making it vital for Manila to move beyond small-range missile systems and extend its attack range as far as 1,600 kilometers.

A detailed assessment in the US army's Military Review estimated over 2,200 ballistic and cruise missiles in China's arsenal, declaring its rocket force as "the largest ground-based missile force in the world."

The US Typhon could make it easier for Manila to transfer its batteries to many attack sites in the region. It also offers the unique advantage of rapid deployment during any high-stakes crisis.

Jay Batongbacal, who directs the Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea at the University of the Philippines, told TRT World that the US Typhon is part of the broader modernisation and longer-term defence strategy of the Philippines, which began with the acquisition of smaller Spike NLOS and Brahmos systems.

"China's increased aggressiveness and belligerence has helped convince the armed forces of the need to acquire missile capabilities as soon as possible," he said.

Manila's role in a Taiwan contingency

For its part, one motivation for the US to sell this weapon system to the Philippines involves Taiwan.

The US feels it could use Manila as a staging ground if China goes to war with Taiwan. But Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has consistently reaffirmed his country's rigid One-China policy on Taiwan, and is wary not to antagonise Beijing.

Manila has good reason to hold its ground.

Stepping on China's Taiwan redline could drag Manila into a broader conflict with Beijing, an outcome that could easily exhaust the Philippines' limited maritime resources, and risk the safety of thousands of Filipino workers hosted in Taiwan.

Even though Manila has given the US access to three key military sites in close proximity to Taiwan, this does not necessarily signal unmitigated support during a Taiwan contingency.

The Philippines is keen to communicate its sense of agency to China, and has declined past US support for South China Sea operations to avoid escalation. The US Typhon system, which is capable of launching missiles into mainland China, raises the stakes for Manila to walk an even tighter rope on Beijing.

"By acquiring the missile system, the Philippines could demonstrate that its use, if it happens, serves its national interests primarily rather than the interest of a major power (the US)," Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman, a research fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told TRT World.

"The Philippines needs better defensive capabilities from the US to prevent a Taiwan-related conflict from spilling over into its waters and territory," he added.

De-escalation efforts

Backing the US in a Taiwan contingency could also put difficult maritime de-escalation talks on even thinner ice. Defending the missile system, Philippines' Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro recently called on China to end its provocative actions in the Sea, while Beijing calls on Manila to change course or risk "hurting its own interests."

The sharp exchange underscores conflicting viewpoints on the system's utility, and it is in Manila's interests to limit Beijing's skepticism of its use. Violent clashes last year have shown that maritime consultations with China, however tense, remain a critical fallback option for Manila.

Backing the US in a Taiwan contingency could put that track at risk, and weaken Manila's claim that the Typhon "is not targeted" against any particular country.

"China seeks not only to control the seas adjacent to the Philippines coastline but the narrative around its actions and the Philippines' response," Chris Gardiner, chief executive officer of the Australia-based Institute for Regional Security, told TRT World.

Gardiner argues that China could project Manila's actions as irresponsible, especially when the Philippines turns to its allies and friends to support it in the defence of its sovereignty.

Thus understood, Manila's pursuit for the US Typhon system is largely driven by self-defence needs, and should not be seen as an endorsement of US interests in a Taiwan contingency.

The latter could pull Manila into a full-blown armed conflict, complicate maritime de-escalation, and invite spillovers, all of the outcomes that Manila is keen to avoid.