Q&A: ‘Israelis and Palestinians will have to negotiate two-state solution'

Hamas's unprecedented October 7 attack has fundamentally changed the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in various aspects, with Tel Aviv launching a cruel military campaign that has brutalised Gaza's civilians.

Tel Aviv has faced a severe backlash from global audiences, which have largely sided with Palestinians subjected to an indiscriminate Israeli bombing campaign. While the Israeli campaign stopped for a week-long ceasefire through a hostage release deal, Tel Aviv restarted its bombing campaign on Palestinian civilians after the truce collapsed.

R. David Harden, a former USAID mission director to the occupied West Bank and Gaza and a former senior adviser to President Barack Obama's special peace envoy for the Middle East, is among several experts who believe the October 7 has changed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict drastically.

Harden, speaking to TRT World, finds that Hamas has become a bigger force across Palestine. And the recent hostage swap deal also showed Hamas's growing clout, according to Harden. Here is how he sees new dynamics in the conflict and the likelihood of Palestinian statehood in the backdrop of the October 7 attack.

TRT World: Do you think the October 7 attack has brought both Israelis and Palestinians closer to the two-state solution?

R David Harden: The Palestinians are not talking about a two-state solution, and the Israelis aren't talking about a two-state solution. And people in Israeli or Palestinian circles that speak about a two-state solution are regarded as naive. The Biden administration and the EU are the only ones pushing the two-state solution. [Türkiye also proposed to leaders of G20 and other platforms to "take an initiative in realising a two-state solution".]

And yet, that may be the only realistic exit. I have written an op-ed in the Israeli publication Haaretz that argues Biden should recognise Palestinian statehood and appoint an ambassador.

What are the real obstacles in realising the two-state solution?

RDH: The Israelis aren't in a mindset of accepting a Palestinian state. They are expanding the settlements [in the occupied West Bank] and are in Gaza right now, and they're not interested in a two-state solution. And I don't know how you resolve the border dispute without resolving the settlements. Of course, there is the question of Jerusalem and the Palestinian aspirations to have Jerusalem as their capital. There would have to be governance over Gaza. And I think that remains deeply unsettled as to how that would work out there.

There will likely be a need for some kind of connectivity between Gaza and the occupied West Bank. And the Israelis are going to have a pretty firm view about that.

There are still displaced Palestinians and neighbouring states, and whether or not they get a right of return and where they will return…all that remains a fundamental question. Also, many Israelis continue to believe that any Palestinian state would be a threat to the state of Israel.

There are other issues which are very important, like water and sanitation. The water situation is solvable, but it requires a lot of negotiations. So, I think that those are examples of some of the issues that affect the two-state solution.

Who will be the sponsors of the two-state solution?

RDH: Ultimately, I do think that the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves are going to have to want it. The parties must have a deal and agree on a process and what the future will look like. It's fine if the US, Türkiye, or anybody else facilitates the conversation. But ultimately, it's a negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Can an international force with a UN mandate to implement international law and realisation of the two-state solution be deployed in Gaza and the occupied West Bank?

RDH: First of all, you will have to get countries to agree to provide forces, and the scope of that work will have to be very clear. Is this just a buffer force? Is this a policing force? Is this a force that can return fire? These all remain unresolved.

The MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) in Egypt is an interesting example of something that has worked. [The MFO is located in and around the Sinai Peninsula and supervises the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace]. UNIFIL (The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) is another example. [UNIFIL was established in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon]

The Israelis and the Palestinians would have to accept the scope of what a (peacekeeping) force would look like…and then you have to get those who would be willing to staff it. But [they will also] have to deal with the complexities of when things go wrong, which they inevitably will. Will this force have the ability to shoot back or not? Then, who holds the force accountable? These are structural questions that remain unresolved. Now, you could just create a new multinational organisation to provide security like the MFO.

How do you evaluate the current Israeli war on Gaza?

RDH: Basically, it's an inflection point because I don't think the Israelis are achieving their war objectives. The Palestinians have gotten a lot of global support for statehood, but they also have a lot of challenges in front of them.

Which ways has the October 7 attack affected the future of Palestinian statehood and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

RDH: It did a few things: Number one: It elevated Palestinian aspirations for statehood to be a prominent global matter that has seized the world. Number two: It also showed the irrelevance of the Palestinian Authority. Number three: Hamas wins by surviving. And they may very well survive. The challenge is how we can envision a Palestinian state without Hamas, which remains unresolved.

Lastly, in some longer terms, I don't think Saudi Arabia-Israel relations will break, but it will likely go forward. Hamas is also interested in breaking that normalisation. But I am not sure that they will be able to do that. [Prior to the October 7 attack, Riyadh and Tel Aviv appeared to be working towards normalising frosty ties]

Has Hamas become a bigger force than PA or Fatah?

RDH: Clearly, Hamas is more dominant than the Palestinian Authority or Fatah.

Do you think this pattern is going to change in the short term?

RDH: I mean, that's the thing. Hamas still has 150 hostages, has daily press briefings and negotiates complex deals. And none of their senior leadership has been captured or killed.

But let's not underestimate the fact that the Palestinian people have been destroyed in Gaza and are facing a massive humanitarian crisis, an economic crisis. And I'm sure while they blame the Israelis for the bombing and all that, they also might not be happy with Hamas. I mean, everybody knew what the Israeli response would be? There was no lack of clarity about the Israeli response after October 7. Everybody knew it.

But Hamas still controls large parts of Gaza. How do you explain it?

RDH: In every war, Hamas takes a punishing blow and comes back stronger. That's what we've seen. Now, I don't know about this situation, this current war, but in the past, they've just gotten stronger in the end. They just got stronger. Does that make you wonder if Israel is being effective if they have these wars every few years…every few years, Hamas is actually stronger. What does it say about the Israeli strategy?

I do think that the outcome remains to be seen here. I think it's going to be hard to have, essentially, the unconditional defeat of Hamas. But it's also too early to say whether or not any challengers within Palestinian circles rise to take on Hamas.

After the October 7 attack, a Ramallah-based Christian-Palestinian activist who runs a fact-checking organisation said that Hamas is the only hope for Palestinians to take back their lands from Israel, and the group has much more support in the occupied West Bank compared to the pre-October 7 period. What does it say to you?

RDH: They are releasing prisoners. Hamas has been able to get prisoners released, while the PA and [Mahmoud] Abbas have never gotten any prisoners released. So yes, Hamas has achieved something by getting prisoners released in a way that none of the other Palestinian factions have been able to do. So people care about that.

Is it strange that Israel negotiates with Hamas, which it regards as a terrorist organisation?

RDH: Yes, it's interesting, right? Because now Israel is effectively engaged with Hamas and negotiating with Hamas. Maybe Qataris are in the middle of it, perhaps the Egyptians are in the middle of it. But at the end of the day, it's a negotiation between Israel and Hamas.

You spent a lot of time in occupied territories. How do you see this negotiation process? Is it normal?

RDH: I think it's just the reality of it. Right? So, if you imagine a hostage situation in law enforcement where somebody is holding some hostages in a building, the police talk to the hostage taker, and they negotiate. And so it's not unusual that this happens.

But it does raise the question that you're pointing out, which is, at the end of the day, the Israelis are having these negotiations about important matters that they care about with Hamas and not with the PA. It's just interesting. It's telling. It tells you where the power rests.

What is going to happen to Hamas?

RDH: I'm not sure the Israelis can defeat Hamas, which means everything that we're describing about a two-state solution seems very remote. Can the Israelis degrade Hamas's capabilities? Yes. Can the Israelis kill some of the leadership or some of the upper middle-level management? Yes. But can they defeat Hamas? I don't think they can.

You've just seen Blinken and Austin talk about "strategic defeat" where Israeli actions create a deeper or stronger Hamas. I think that's a distinct possibility.