Will Iran accede to Turkish influence across Caucasus's Zangezur Corridor?

Recent political developments across the Middle East, including the weakening of Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and the toppling of ally Bashar al Assad in Syria, do not bode well for Iran.

In the coming months, experts project a possible retreat of the country from the Middle East, after a decade of power politics. This comes as Türkiye continues to increase its political leverage in different areas from Syria, where the current government has friendly terms with Ankara, to Caucasia, a turbulent region, where the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance has reached new heights since Baku's liberation of the Karabakh region from Armenia in 2020.

Turkish influence is increasing in both the Middle East and Central Asia, the ancient fatherland of the Turks and home to rich energy sources from gas to oil and uranium. Amid this change, Tehran has been recalculating its role in Caucasia, reassessing its opposition to the opening of the strategic Zangezur Corridor, a trade and transportation route, which connects Istanbul with Baku.

Beyond "making political statements," Iran cannot block the development of the Zangezur Corridor, says Zakhid Farrukh Mamedov, professor of international economics at Azerbaijan State University of Economics in Baku. The corridor remains under construction but is nearing completion this year.

The corridor, which aims to link Europe with Central Asia through a land route running from Türkiye's east to neighbouring Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave and further east reaching the Caspian Sea through Armenia-Iran and Azerbaijan-Iran border areas, is too big of a project for Iran to block due to linked Western, Turkic and Russian interests, according to Mamedov.

The corridor is ‘inevitable'

Despite Iran's refusal to recognise the emerging paradigm backed by both regional and international powers on the development of the Zangezur Corridor, the land route project offers to meet the essential economic needs of Caucasia, bringing stability, peace and economic growth, the professor says.

"Almost everybody from the US to Russia agrees that this corridor is the guarantee of future prosperity. It is the door to the future. It is not possible to prevent the realisation of this project," Mamedov, who is also the head of the International Eurasia Scientific Research Center at Azerbaijan State University of Economics, tells TRT World.

Cooperating is a better attitude than opposing such a project, which benefits everybody including Iran, adds the Azerbaijani economist. "Iran has no other choice than agreeing on this project."

Despite the growing regional consensus on the corridor's opening, Iran "has always opposed the corridor" out of national security concerns, says Kamer Kasim, a professor of international relations at Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University.

In September, Iran's foreign minister suggested that the opening of the corridor could compromise Armenian territorial integrity, which Tehran sees as "a red line."

Iran has fears that if the corridor becomes operational in the region, "it will cut its land link to Armenia," an ally of Tehran, Kasim tells TRT World. Iran is also concerned that the further realignment of Baku and Ankara, the two Turkic capitals, through the route will weaken its regional hold as connectivity from Central Asia to Türkiye strengthens.

Despite these fears, the corridor could benefit Iran, a country that has been isolated under Western sanctions for decades, by allowing Tehran access to other regional states with better links, says Kasim.

After its Syria failure, Iran might conclude that its proxy war across the Middle East costs itself too much, straining the country's economic capacity, which might force Tehran to rethink its approach to projects like the Zangezur Corridor, according to Kasim. In any case, if Armenia becomes a partner, the corridor might be opened without Iran's participation, he adds.

Time to recalibrate?

According to Mamedov, Tehran's waning influence in the Middle East could make Iran recalibrate its policy on the corridor. Iran's foreign ministry has recently offered a reconciliatory message saying that the opening of the corridor is "not a political issue" for Tehran anymore.

"Iran has a lot of internal problems from growing economic hardships to currency devaluation. Without addressing those issues, Iran can not exert its influence in a proper sense across the Middle East as well as Caucasia," says Mamedov.

In this perspective, the 3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, three Caucasian states, alongside three surrounding powers Türkiye, Iran, and Russia, is an ideal structure to address economic and political deadlock related to the formation of the Zangezur Corridor and other regional issues, says the Azerbaijani academic.

Without Georgia's participation, the 3+3 platform held its latest meeting in Istanbul in October, expressing Its willingness "to explore cooperation opportunities in the fields of transport, communication, trade, energy, investment, and connectivity."

No regional power can "reject" the emerging ground reality of the corridor and its economic profits, says Mamedov. In addition to Türkiye and Azerbaijan, the two Turkic states, other regional actors including Iran and Armenia, a land-locked state with a small population, will also economically benefit from the corridor's opening, he says.

Russian approach

Iran's ally Russia, which had ruled large parts of Caucasia like Türkiye in the past, could also potentially benefit from the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, says Mamedov. “Moscow understands that the emergence of this corridor is inevitable,” says the professor.

Last year, Russia's longtime Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made a supporting statement on the Zangezur Corridor, criticising Armenia's stance, which has opposed its opening like Iran.

"We favour signing a peace treaty and unblocking these transport corridors as soon as possible,” Lavrov said in a TV interview, referring to a possible deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan to end the conflict on Karabakh. That area had been occupied by Armenian forces from the 1990s until its complete liberation by Baku in 2023, despite the region being internationally recognised under Azerbaijani sovereignty.

"Regrettably, the Armenian leadership is sabotaging the agreement concerning transport routes via Armenia's Syunik Province, which was signed by (Armenian) Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. It is difficult to understand where they are coming from," added the top Russian diplomat. The Zangezur Corridor runs through Armenia's Syunik Province.

Lavrov's criticism toward Armenian leadership is related to the 2020 ceasefire agreement's article 9, which stated that "All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked."

Yerevan "shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions," the article said, referring to the opening of the corridor, which is located between the mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.