Armenia’s military build-up might push Azerbaijan to a ‘preemptive war’

As the outgoing Biden administration and the global agenda are consumed by crises, including the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, it appears that challenges in other regions, such as the South Caucasus, are being overlooked.

In the first week of October, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev issued a stern warning to Armenia and Western countries over their efforts to arm Yerevan at a crucial juncture in history.

Aliyeh was speaking to former internally displaced people in the newly-built city of Jabrail, which was completely destroyed during the years of Armenian occupation and liberated in 2020.

During the event, President Aliyev questioned the motives of the Western countries supplying arms to Armenia and asked whether they believed Azerbaijan would stand idly by or wait until the new buildings being constructed are destroyed again by these weapons.

He further emphasised that Azerbaijan will take all necessary measures to ensure the country’s future security and development. "On one hand, they speak of peace and tell lies; on the other, they engage in large-scale armament," Aliyev added.

Earlier in September, an aide to the President suggested that proportional restrictions should be applied to the Armenian armed forces, similar to those imposed on Iraq after the Iraq-Kuwait war.

He argued that such a measure would be justified since Armenia is one of the few countries in the post-World War II international system that attempted to seize neighbouring territory by force.

These and similar statements from Azerbaijani officials are contradicted and overshadowed by the cautious optimism for peace recently expressed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia.

However, these messages deserve more serious and genuine attention.

The fragile prospects for a peaceful settlement are threatened by the slow pace of negotiations and Armenia's ongoing militarisation. Azerbaijani media has reported frequent deliveries of weaponry to Armenia, and many Azerbaijani experts believe that Armenia is deliberately stalling negotiations to buy time for militarisation and potential revanchism.

There are other contradictions, too. While Armenia claims that Azerbaijan’s military budget has reached 14-15 percent of its GDP, Yerevan itself has increased its military expenses by 46 percent compared to last year, further proving its militarisation efforts.

Despite the complexities of the global landscape, Armenia manages to procure weaponry from various sources that are in conflict with each other in other regions.

In addition to receiving arms from France – including the Caesar self-propelled howitzer – and military assistance from the US, Iran International reported in July that Tehran and Yerevan signed a significant arms deal worth $500 million.

Moreover, as a member of the CSTO, Armenia has resumed acquiring offensive military equipment from Russia too.

Will Azerbaijan strike first?

As Armenia ratchets up its provocative arms procurement, Azerbaijan would be tempted to take preemptive action.

Even James Warlick, the former American co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, noted that Armenia's acquisition of weapons from France strains relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan at a time when they are close to signing a peace treaty.

In his view, France should have finalised any arms deal with Armenia only after a peace agreement.

While the concept of "preemptive war" was somewhat distorted when introduced into US national security policy by the Bush administration before the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions, it is distinct from "preventive war".

The key difference lies in timing: preemptive war addresses imminent threats, while preventive war targets long-term, potential threats. This distinction is crucial, as many still confuse the two.

Preemptive war is generally seen as a 'war of necessity' based on credible evidence of an immediate threat and is justified under international law, specifically Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In contrast, preventive war is viewed as a 'war of choice,' driven by strategic calculations rather than legal precedent, and is often equated with illegitimate aggression by contemporary scholars.

In light of Armenia's militarisation drive and without a peace agreement, any military action by Azerbaijan would be preemptive rather than preventive.

This is further supported by Armenia's previous occupation of internationally-recognised Azerbaijani territories for 30 years, which ended only due to Yerevan’s defeat in the 2020 war, not voluntary withdrawal.

Therefore, under international law, the Second Karabakh War was an act of self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

After the 2020 war, President Aliyev warned on multiple occasions that if Azerbaijan perceives any threats from Armenia, it will take action to eliminate them anywhere on Armenian territory.

But he also emphasised that Azerbaijan has no plans to invade Armenia and expressed assurance that there will not be a third war.

A new chapter

Preemptive strikes on legitimate military targets could mark a new chapter in the long-running conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Previously, all military operations occurred within Azerbaijan's internationally recognised territories, with all the associated devastation and tragedies.

However, future confrontations might unfold on Armenian soil. During the 2020 war, the Azerbaijani army deliberately avoided entering Armenia's recognised territories, limiting its operations strictly to within Azerbaijan's borders.

Additionally, it refrained from entering areas in Karabakh, where Armenians were densely populated and accepted the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to protect civilians.

Despite having the military capacity to advance further, Azerbaijan chose to avoid these areas to prevent civilian casualties.

Furthermore, during the 2020 war, Azerbaijani operations focused only on territories where Azerbaijanis had historically been the majority.

The only strike within Armenia's recognised territory was on a military target far from civilian areas. On October 14, 2020, Azerbaijan destroyed a missile system in Armenia that had been used to target Azerbaijani civilians.

This strike was preemptive, as the missile system had already launched multiple attacks on cities far from the conflict zone, such as Ganja, Barda, and Qarayusufli, killing scores of civilians, and was poised to launch new strikes before its destruction.

These strikes included the use of internationally banned cluster munitions and SCUD-B missiles.

Human Rights Watch later confirmed that Armenian forces had carried out indiscriminate attacks on Azerbaijani civilians during the conflict.

Relying on the security umbrella of the CSTO, Armenia believed that its strikes on residential areas far from the conflict zone would go unpunished, assuming Azerbaijan would be unable to retaliate or that any response might provoke Russian intervention to protect its ally.

Now, with its ongoing militarisation, it appears that Armenia is seeking to secure Western backing, potentially setting the provocation for a confrontation between Azerbaijan and the West.

Following the Second Karabakh War, the only preemptive action taken by Azerbaijan within Armenia’s recognised territory occurred on September 12, 2022.

Then Azerbaijani troops destroyed Armenian military infrastructure deep inside Armenian territory without civilian casualties, estimated to be worth over $1 billion, using precision-guided weapons.

At the time, this infrastructure posed an imminent threat to the vulnerable and newly-liberated Kalbajar and Lachin regions of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan's main concerns are twofold: Armenia's militarisation with support from France, India, Iran, and the US and the rise of revanchist sentiments in Armenia.

Azerbaijani officials and media have been vocal in warning both the Armenian society and Armenia’s foreign supporters.

Due to deep mutual distrust, Azerbaijan has made two key demands to ensure Armenia has no hidden agenda regarding Karabakh: First, Armenia must remove the annexation clause from its Constitution. Second, both countries should jointly request the dissolution of the Minsk Group.

Azerbaijan harbours mistrust not only toward Armenia but also toward the West.

Even before the 2020 war, there was a strong belief in the West's liberal hypocrisy regarding the Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan.

This sentiment has only intensified with Armenia's increasing militarisation and the support it receives from countries like France and the US.

While condemning and warning Azerbaijan is one thing, actively arming a country that occupied Azerbaijani territories is quite another—it does little to foster peace and trust in the region.

If the West is genuinely interested in defending Armenia from an ‘imaginary attack’ by Azerbaijan, there are far more effective tools for protection than supplying arms.