Here's how Pakistan could address rising violence in Balochistan

After recent deadly BLA attacks, Pakistan's challenge is to balance security operations with meaningful dialogue and economic incentives in the province.

Residents prepare the funeral of the shooting victims, in Musakhail district, Balochistan province on August 26, 2024. / Photo: AFP
AFP

Residents prepare the funeral of the shooting victims, in Musakhail district, Balochistan province on August 26, 2024. / Photo: AFP

Following a string of coordinated terrorist attacks in Pakistan's Balochistan province late last month, all eyes are set on Pakistan's effective response options.

The attacks, perpetrated by Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) terrorists, killed over 70 people and signalled further alarm: it was a rare instance of Baloch attacks stretching to border areas of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province. Previous attacks were largely concentrated within Balochistan, and away from its borderlands.

"All possible steps should be taken to improve the security situation in Balochistan," said Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari shortly after the attacks.

Now as the state formulates a long-term response to rising terrorism in Balochistan, what could effective response options look like? Given the BLA's close links with other separatist terrorist groups, and its desire to undermine state engagement with local Baloch leaders, the need for a multipronged security strategy is critical.

Bolstering dialogue

Pakistan's security forces have effectively used intelligence-based operations (IBOs) to target terrorists in the wake of recent attacks. But weakening their support base requires an additional set of measures.

This includes pursuing genuine dialogue with local rights outfits and Baloch youth movements that have called on the state to protect their fundamental rights and facilitate accountability of alleged violations. Terrorist groups such as the BLA continue to oppose any such dialogue as it threatens their ability to target alienated Baloch youth and step up recruitment as it fights for an independent state.

Their alienation stems from the state's perceived interference in local governance, and its use of force to deal with protests against extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and other alleged rights violations.

As state dialogue with trusted Baloch leaders became less frequent over the years, the BLA had an easier time recruiting manpower and more female suicide bombers to aid anti-state operations. Last month's attacks were the latest proof point.

Thus, long-term dialogue with Baloch rights groups and peace activists would benefit Pakistan's counterterrorism response considerably. This would help the government draw the distinction between anti-state forces and locals who are simply seeking government support on rights accountability.

The BLA has sought to blur the line between the two after merging with other militant groups under the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) coalition. This creates a need to win more public trust and pursue dignified engagement with ethnic Baloch through multi-year dialogue.

Government outreach towards the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), an ethnic Baloch group of peace activists and students, provides an important starting point. State dialogue could take the form of "joint committees" that draw representation from all major political parties, civil society representatives, ethnic Baloch leaders and peaceful youth wings to coordinate expectations on rights protections and counterterrorism operations.

Past government attempts at negotiations with Baloch community leaders have lacked multi-stakeholder representation and continuity across political administrations. Trust deficit has been a major impediment over the years.

Popular tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed in a military operation in 2006, triggering the fifth phase of a decades-old insurgency. Peaceful protests on rights accountability have been met with force, and there is lingering suspicion in Balochistan that their concerns are deliberately sidelined by the government.

AFP

Residents row a boat to cross a flooded street after heavy rains in Gwadar in Balochistan province on March 2, 2024 (AFP).

This is why the Balochistan government's recent decision to form a joint committee with the BYC could serve as a test case to put a long-delayed peace process back on track. By bringing the province's key political stakeholders onboard, the state can ramp up IBOs against terrorist groups and allay fears of collateral damage among locals.

Development and economic incentives

There is a dire need for government investment in Balochistan's local industries, labour-training, education and healthcare sectors. Consistent state support could address a growing sense of economic deprivation and marginalisation among local Baloch.

The BLA and its allies have strengthened their attack capabilities at a time when Balochistan has endured high unemployment, poverty and bleak growth prospects. These factors have contributed to a governance vacuum that BLA and allies have used to organise support.

The multibillion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), could lay the groundwork for timely intervention.

Consider preferred employment of local Baloch labourers in energy and infrastructure projects. Policy support could dispel misperceptions that CPEC gives preference to non-native workers at the expense of Balochistan's sizable youth population. This is important because BLA and its Majeed Brigade "Suicide Squad" have spent months targeting Chinese investment projects and personnel based on similar assumptions.

Thus, induction of Baloch labourers in energy and infrastructure projects could promote local ownership of CPEC, making it difficult for Baloch terrorists to exploit their grievances to stage more attacks.

An opening appears in sight.

The federal government is getting ready to develop five new economic zones under CPEC's latest phase, which includes innovation, livelihood and employment generation corridors.

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The political and economic empowerment of ethnic Baloch is central to a multipronged strategy that clamps down on Baloch terrorist groups, their ideology, but also enlists local support for more intelligence-based operations.

The scale of these projects demands significant labour procurement and training, as well as renewed attention to skills upgradation across BRI-backed training and vocational centres.

Thus, reorienting the corridor's focus on local labour engagement could strengthen government rapport with Balochistan's sizeable youth population. In effect, this could offer important pushback against terrorist groups looking to widen the gap between the Pakistani state and locals in the country's most impoverished province.

Thus understood, a security strategy backed by development incentives and state dialogue could constitute an effective response to Balochistan's complex challenges.

The political and economic empowerment of ethnic Baloch is central to a multipronged strategy that clamps down on Baloch terrorist groups, their ideology, but also enlists local support for more intelligence-based operations.

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