The invasion that never was? What's next for Russia in Ukraine

On the night of February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Russia’s recognition of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) as two independent domains. Putin’s decision started a new era in the crisis between Russia and the West over Ukraine. Russia has made its move and has chosen to escalate the conflict by violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Now, the question is what Russia’s next move in its chess game with the West will be.

If Russia uses this move as a stepping stone for further invasion of Ukraine, it will have to face grave economic and military costs. In addition, such advances may adversely impact issues that Russia finds irreconcilable, including the expansion of NATO and Ukraine’s orientation. 

On the other hand, de-escalation will not benefit Russia either. From the beginning of the crisis, Russian soldiers stationed at the border between Ukraine and Russia have made Russian threats credible. It was because of these troops that Russia could negotiate its security concerns at the highest levels. Therefore, the most rational action for Russia will be keeping tensions high and continuing psychological warfare.  

By recognising DPR and LPR, Russia could maintain pressure without excessive burden on its economy and military. After the recognition, Russian troops were welcomed in the two breakaway republics, and Russia is unlikely to face the harshest of sanctions. Russia has been supporting LPR and DPR economically and diplomatically since they came into existence. The recognition of their statehood will not create a drastic shift on the ground if there is no provocation. 

In addition, this was by no means the first time Russia helped form and then recognised breakaway republics in other states. In the past three decades, Russia has supported the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Transnistria in Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia following the 2008 war. In Ukraine, besides eventually recognising DPR and LPR, Russia went one step further and annexed Crimea. Therefore, the recognition of DPR and LPR should not be considered an important step and is unlikely to be a stepping stone for further invasion. Russia is also unlikely to reverse its recognition of DPR and LPR since such a step would harm its credibility.

Further escalation with the advancement of the Russian military will mean Russia has to risk more without uncertain gains. Thus, Russia is unlikely to escalate the conflict by invading other parts of Ukraine. It is correct that the Kremlin does not respect the sovereignty of Ukraine and has issues with the increasing Western military and political influence in the country. However, a further invasion will incur costs much higher than recognising territories already under Russian control. 

Ukraine is a country with over 40 million people, a strengthened military, and a territory larger than mainland France. Such an advance will trigger augmented Western military assistance to Ukraine, making war as costly as possible for Russia. Such action would also be incompatible with Russia’s strategic culture, which advises cost-effective actions. One should remember how Russia gained significant influence over Syria, Libya, and even in Central Africa through modest strategic investments. 

Between escalation and de-escalation, a state of constant pressure on the West benefits Russia in multiple ways. Contrary to the tendency before the crisis, the West takes Russia’s security concerns seriously. Western responses to Russia’s diplomatic initiatives were far from satisfying Russia. But receiving written responses from the West and signals for the continuation of dialogue is still colossal progress. 

Russia could also create a strategic/diplomatic aura where important matters are discussed between the US and Russia while European countries are dismissed. Keeping such an atmosphere alive will supplement Russia’s status in today’s unsettled international order. The Kremlin would like to maintain this as much as possible. Such status and recognition also put Russia in a position of decision-maker on issues beyond its immediate sphere of influence.

Russia will avoid invading Ukraine further but will try to find other ways to keep the pressure on the West. Such a middle way between escalation and de-escalation will help Russia achieve its strategic goals regarding Ukraine, Europe’s security architecture, and Russia’s status in today’s international order. Until now, Russia has not deviated from this middle way and should be expected to stick to this policy.