Why the US is concerned about Serb groups enabling an anti-NATO agenda

The two non-Western countries with agendas in the Western Balkans that most unsettle the US and EU are Russia and China. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels see southern/central European states’ integration into the EU and NATO as necessary for stabilising the region and countering Moscow and Beijing’s influence in the Western Balkans.

Western concerns about Moscow’s actions in the Western Balkans increased after Russia’s full-scale military offensive against Ukraine last year. Although Russia can’t compete economically with the West in the region, Moscow can foment instability in the Western Balkans with minimal effort and resources. Russia takes advantage of ethnic tensions, religious divides, and historical grievances in former Yugoslav republics to undermine the West’s interests in stabilising the Western Balkans as well as integrating these countries into the EU and NATO.

Local players aligned with Moscow’s interests are key to Russia’s ability to assert influence in the region. The Western Balkan country closest to Russia is Serbia, which, apart from Belarus, was the only European country to not impose sanctions on Russia in February 2022. Ethnic Serb and pro-Russian actors in neighbouring countries – Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik in Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Serb Democracy in Montenegro, and Srpska Lista in Kosovo – help Moscow assert its clout in southern/central Europe.

Since February 2022, the US has been increasingly concerned about these Serb groups taking actions that could advance the Kremlin’s anti-EU and anti-NATO agendas. Within this context, the Biden administration has continued Trump-era policies that increasingly accommodate Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s government. The thinking is that Belgrade is needed for reining in these Moscow-oriented Serb actors. Therefore, preserving stability in the Western Balkans requires concessions to Belgrade. Certain voices in some of Serbia’s neighbours and in Washington frequently accuse President Joe Biden’s administration of “appeasing” a revanchist Serbia.

Understanding Serbian-Russian Relations

Despite the West accommodating Belgrade, Serbia is often called a Russian “proxy state”. Although this label is misleading and reductionist, Belgrade and Moscow’s bilateral ties help explain why many see Serbia this way.

After February 2022, Serbia did not join Europe’s anti-Russia consensus. Belgrade refused to implement Western sanctions on Moscow. Shortly after Russia’s full-scale military offensive against Ukraine, Serbia’s mostly-state owned Air Serbia doubled the number of Belgrade-Moscow flights to 15 a week. Russia took advantage of the “Serbian backdoor” after the EU banned Russian airlines and planes from using EU airspace—a ban that didn’t prevent Serbian airlines from crossing EU airspace.

Serbian media is filled with Russian propaganda, which is popular among Serbians. As of March 2022, only 26 percent of Serbia’s population saw Moscow as responsible for the Ukraine war. Some far-right Serbian nationalists held anti-NATO and pro-Russia demonstrations in Belgrade shortly after Moscow’s 2022 military offiensive against Ukraine. Those aren’t really happening anymore, but they nonetheless illustrated how grievances in Serbian society, over what many Serbians see as NATO aggression in 1999, prompt segments of Serbian society to revere Russia as a benign force and bulwark against the Western alliance. Many in the West were shocked to see t-shirts featuring Vladimir Putin’s face being sold in many kiosks and the “Z” symbol painted on many walls in the capital of an EU candidate country.

Religion also bonds many Serbians to Russia by virtue of shared Orthodox identities. Putin uses the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) to strengthen Russian influence in the Western Balkans with the SOC often serving to provide religious legitimacy to various aspects of Moscow’s foreign policy actions. In the case of Ukraine, the SOC’s patriarchate did not condemn Russia for the military offensive and instead called for dialogue.

But none of this proves that Serbia is Russia’s “proxy state”. The reality is more complicated.

For starters, there has never been a time since Yugoslavia’s implosion in which Belgrade has been as integrated with the West as it is today. Serbia’s military coordinates with NATO much more frequently than it does with Russia’s military. Among Serbia’s top five exports partners, four are in the EU (Germany, Italy, Romania, and Hungary) while Russia doesn’t make that list.

There are also cracks in Belgrade-Moscow relations. Early on in the Ukraine war, Putin referenced NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia-Kosovo to justify Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine. Many Serbians found that to be a Russian betrayal.

Since March 2022, Serbia also voted with the West at the UN when it came to resolutions condemning Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. Furthermore, Serbian arms have ended up in Ukraine’s hands amid the ongoing war. The April 2023 Pentagon Leaks included classified documents showing how Belgrade had agreed to arm Ukraine or provided those weapons previously despite Serbia’s claims to be “neutral” in the conflict. Officials in Belgrade denied this, alleging that the reports stemmed from the desire of certain parties to drag Serbia into the war. However, Defence Minister Milos Vucevic said that Serbia-made weaponry could possibly “magically appear” in Kiev’s hands.

Realpolitik Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Belgrade-Moscow relations are fundamentally about pragmatism, not religion or emotion. As the world becomes more multipolar, Serbia doesn’t know what the international geopolitical order will look like in 50 years. Thus, Belgrade doesn’t want to put all its eggs into either a Western or Eastern basket.

Rooted in the Tito era of non-alignment, Serbia conducts a balanced foreign policy, not aligning with one geopolitical bloc or another. As an EU candidate, Serbia can’t officially be a part of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). But it has observer status in NAM and its approach to global affairs reflects the international organisation’s thinking. Such long-term strategies of hedging, coupled with the importance of Russia’s role at the UN Security Council vis-à-vis the Kosovo file and natural gas requirements explain Belgrade’s refusal to embrace the West’s anti-Russian agenda beginning last year.

Russia also values having a country in central Europe which is as friendly to Moscow as is Serbia. Even if Russia has been disappointed with some of Serbia’s UN votes on Ukraine and Belgrade’s cooperation with the US and NATO, the Kremlin is pragmatic and understands that no country in the heart of Europe will be warmer to Moscow than Serbia. This gives Vučić room to work with the West more than Putin would like.

Six countries which are EU and/or NATO members and two EU candidates surround landlocked Serbia. Belgrade knows that the West can easily exert pressure on Serbia. Already the EU’s December 2022 oil embargo essentially forced Serbia off Russian oil. If Belgrade pushes the envelope too far in challenging the West, there could be huge prices for Serbians to pay.

Ultimately, Vučić must be understood as a shrewd leader who adeptly navigates geopolitical instability, skillfully playing different actors off each other to maximise Serbia’s clout. Vučić is aware of his value to both the West and Russia and does not want Serbia fully dependent on either—nor is he in a position to excessively antagonise either. As great power competition intensifies and the future of the West’s so-called “liberal rules-based order” is in question, Belgrade wants to keep options open and maintain strong relationships with Russia and China.

This isn’t what the West wants from Serbia. But for Belgrade, it’s a pragmatic approach to foreign policy.