Turkish coups and the army’s decreasing influence under Erdogan leadership

Since 1960, Türkiye’s democratic governance has been interrupted several times by military interventions, severely damaging the country’s progressive political agenda.

All military interventions happened when a conservative government was in power – in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2007.

The last of these military assaults on an elected government occurred on July 15, 2016, when rogue elements in the Turkish army – members of the FETO terrorist organisation – launched a coup attempt against the democratically elected government of Türkiye.

Besides stifling democracy by banning political parties, the military interventions also led to the execution of political leaders like Adnan Menderes, the then-prime minister of the Democrat Party (DP) government between 1950 and 1960.

But this trend of military interference has effectively ended under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who heads the AK Party.

The Erdogan leadership, backed by a large section of Turkish society, was instrumental in not only defeating the 2016 coup attempt but also successfully challenging the 2007 memorandum, which attempted to prevent Erdogan from becoming the country’s president.

Over the past two decades, the empowerment of civilian leadership under the AK Party has seen Recep Tayyip Erdogan claim back-to-back election victories since 2002.

Here is a brief history of Turkish military coups and how the AK Party challenged the military’s interference in civilian politics:

1960 coup

In 1950, Ankara moved to a multi-party system with the end of the one-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of Türkiye.

In the next three elections in 1950, 1954 and 1957, the DP achieved back-to-back victories, riding on the popularity of Menderes.

However, the DP’s dominance in the hustings annoyed the CHP and the military, both of which advocated a harsh interpretation of French secularism (laicism) that demanded a clear separation of state and religious affairs.

A section of army officers, who claimed to be inspired by Ataturk’s principles, decided to oust the Menderes government on May 27, 1960. This despite the fact that Ataturk, a former Ottoman general and military leader of the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922), had advised the military leadership not to interfere in civilian politics.

Remarkably, the 1960 coup was done bypassing the military’s chain of command, and top generals became part of it only in the later stages of the military intervention.

While its first leading figure was Cemal Madanoglu, a left-leaning general, it was backed mainly by young officers.

Some analysts believe that a section of the coup plotters might have had a pro-US tilt, as the Menderes government was known to have sought political rapprochement with the Soviet Union prior to the plot.

The coup brought a new constitution as well as a crucial legal framework, the Internal Service Law, which regulated the workings of the Turkish Armed Forces and legitimised the military’s interference in civilian politics.

Article 35 of this law tasked the army with the specific duty of “protecting and watching over the Turkish homeland and Republic of Türkiye designated by its constitution”. This article was in force until 2013, ensuring a legal ground for successive military interventions.

1971 memorandum

Like the 1960 coup, the 1971 military memorandum was launched against a conservative government under the Justice Party (AP) leader Suleyman Demirel, who claimed to follow Menderes’s political objectives. Demirel led his party to victory in both the 1965 and 1969 elections.

While Demirel claimed to be the new embodiment of the DP legacy, the traditional wing of his party criticised his pacifist stance against the military’s continuing clout on Turkish politics. The dissenting wing demanded revocation of all political bans on the former Democrat Party members, but Demirel argued that such a move might anger the army.

As a result, the traditionalist wing – which included several leading AP deputies – left the party in late 1970, weakening Demirel’s hold in power.

In the meantime, violent clashes broke out between leftists and right-wing political groups. The ideological differences spilled over to the military, where factions with left and right-wing affiliations were formed, defending opposing political views.

In 1971, tensions between the military factions escalated as a left-leaning faction led by Madanoglu, the leading officer of the 1960 coup, planned to oust the Demirel government through a coup on March 9.

In response, a right-leaning military wing backed by much of the chain of command prevented the coup attempt and then gave a military memorandum to the Demirel government, urging him to leave power to pave the way for a new government backed by the army.

The memorandum included a stern warning to the democratically-elected government. “If this matter cannot be realised quickly, the Turkish Armed Forces is determined to take over the administration directly by fulfilling its duty to protect and watch over the Republic of Türkiye, which is given to it by the laws,” it said.

When the Demirel government resigned, the military saw it as a sign of compliance with their demands. It didn’t push further, like dissolving parliament or banning parties.

The new government that assumed power under Nihat Erim, a former CHP deputy, launched a largescale purge in the military to kick out personnel with political affiliations. It also backed the execution of some leading communist leaders like Deniz Gezmis.

Demirel’s compliance with the 1971 military intervention and his support to the Erim government diminished his political standing; he didn’t win a majority in parliament after his ouster but led several coalition governments as the PM.

Bulent Ecevit, a leading CHP politician who opposed the 1971 memorandum, became the prime minister in 1973 as his party got the most votes in the national elections the same year.

1980 coup

As coalition governments became the order of the day during the 1970s, the military saw these developments as a failure of the Turkish political class.

The military intervened once again in September 1980 and with full force.

In 1977, then PM Demirel also launched a military purge based on inside information that leading generals might launch a coup to topple him.

Kenan Evren, a top general, took over as the commander of Turkish Land Forces, a position traditionally seen as the stepping stone to becoming the chief of general staff in the future.

Paradoxically, Evren ousted the Demirel government in 1980, banning him and other political leaders along with their parties. Unlike previous interventions, Evren’s military rule continued for over three years.

The 1983 elections saw Turgut Ozal, a former member of the Milli Gorus movement – which had long opposed the military’s clout over politics – become the next prime minister as his Anavatan Party (ANAP) gained a majority in parliament. Ironically, just two days before the polls, Evren had made a veiled criticism of Ozal.

Postmodern coup of 1997

Like the 1970s, the 1990s, too, witnessed the emergence of coalition governments, with Ozal’s party losing the parliamentary majority.

On the other hand, Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah Party (RP), the political wing of the Milli Gorus, gained strength across the Turkish electorate as opposed to centre-left and centre-right parties. After the 1995 poll, Erbakan formed a coalition government in 1996.

Like the previous Menderes and Demirel governments, the strictly secularist military did not like the Erbakan government, which was ousted in army-led political manoeuvring, starting with the February 28 military memorandum in 1997. The military intervention is called a postmodern coup due to its behind-the-scenes orchestration.

During the process, Erbakan and Erdogan, the latter, who was the RP mayor of Istanbul at the time, were banned from politics as the RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court.

Once again, much like previous coups, the February 28 intervention made Turkish politics more fractured, leading to a multi-party coalition as well as a large economic crisis, which would essentially bring Erdogan’s AK Party to power single-handedly in 2002.

AK Party weakens military interference

The AK Party, which is rooted in the RP but formed as a centre-right party in 2001, claimed Türkiye’s large conservative electorate by winning a landslide election victory in 2002. The AK party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan launched large-scale political reforms to further democratise the Turkish state and its institutions.

But in 2007, when the country’s presidential election was scheduled in parliament, a political crisis emerged as the military issued an e-memorandum against the Erdogan government, voicing veiled opposition against the AK Party’s candidate, Abdullah Gul, whose wife wears a headscarf.

The e-memorandum came in response to a debate raised by some politicians and commentators, who defended a strict interpretation of French laicism, claiming that electing a president with a hijabi wife would undermine the secularist foundations of the Turkish state.

Unlike previous interventions, the Erdogan government did not cave into the military pressure and called a critical referendum in October to change the constitution to enact the rule of electing presidents by a popular vote.

The AK Party won a significant victory in the October referendum as 69 percent voted ‘yes’, favouring electing presidents by popular vote.

Many argue that this was a breaking point in weeding out the military’s influence in Turkish politics, as the AK Party also won a big majority in the July elections prior to the referendum. After this turning point, the military continued to lose ground against the civilian leadership.

In 2013, the AK Party government also revoked Article 35 of the army’s Internal Service Law, which gave the military a legal ground to intervene in civilian politics. The following year, Erdogan was elected the country’s president for the first time by a popular vote.

But again, on July 15, 2016, a failed coup attempt was launched by rogue elements in the Turkish army. These members of the FETO terrorist organisation, who aimed to infiltrate state institutions, made a desperate attempt to launch a failed bloody coup against the democratically elected government.

Erdogan and his democratic allies won once again against the coup plotters. In 2017, Erdogan called another referendum to change the country’s parliamentary system to a presidential model, aiming to establish a firm political structure against any other military intervention.

The measure was approved, and Türkiye turned into a presidential system.