Can a deal to sell nuclear submarines to Australia protect Southeast Asia?

The signing of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States on September 16, 2021 opened up a new era in Australia’s defence and security.

The agreement is not a military alliance or collective defence arrangement in the same way as NATO, or the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. It’s a technology-sharing agreement with two key technology pillars. The agreement continues to make progress, with the US Congress passing the 2024 National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) in December 2023.

This includes key provisions for AUKUS, smoothing the way forward for both the acquisition of nuclear powered but conventionally armed submarines from 2033 under Pillar One, and also the lifting of trade barriers that should allow cooperation in critical and emerging technologies to progress faster under Pillar Two.

The acquisition of nuclear powered but conventionally armed submarines by Australia represent a huge leap forward in naval capability for a state that previously has only operated conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines of limited range and endurance.

The acquisition of eight nuclear submarines (SSNs) will begin in 2033, comprising the purchase of three to five US Virginia class SSNs, and then transition to the proposed SSN AUKUS boats in the 2040s.

There have been some Southeast Asian states, including some under pressure from China, which have raised concerns about the implications of nuclear non-proliferation and the potential for a regional arms race.

These concerns have in turn been addressed by reassurance from the Australian government in diplomatic discussions with both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as Australia’s neighbours in ASEAN and the Southwest Pacific. It’s clear that whilst some Southeast Asian states continue to air concerns, as noted in an article in the Lowy Interpreter by Melissa Conley-Tyler, that criticism is receding, and China’s efforts to undermine AUKUS through diplomatic pressure is failing.

Yet, it’s important to address the concerns of Australia’s neighbours on AUKUS, particularly in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and also the prospect of a regional arms race.

Firstly, in relation to nuclear non-proliferation concerns, Australian SSNs will not be armed with nuclear weapons, and Australia has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.

The sustainment and operation of these boats’ nuclear reactors will occur in a manner that is in full compliance with Australia’s obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and more broadly, with Australia’s obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol of the NPT that will include full verification measures throughout the life of type of the submarines.

Nor will Australia establish a civil nuclear industry that could produce nuclear fuel for the submarines. The reactors on board will be installed at the time of construction and remain sealed throughout the life of type of the vessel, and then be disposed safely, with the fuel stored under full IAEA safeguards. No fissile material will be diverted for other purposes.

It's also important to note in comparison, China’s steady buildup and modernisation of its own nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarine capabilities, with the US Office of Naval Intelligence suggesting as of 2020 that Chinese SSNs will increase from seven boats in 2020 to 13 boats by 2030.

Additionally, internationally respected naval analyst H. I. Sutton suggests that “Beijing is gearing up for mass production of a new generation of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.”

In a separate report, Sutton states that “while the AUKUS nuclear submarine project between the United States, United Kingdom and Australia made headlines globally, China’s secretive nature allows them to pursue submarine development without revealing their true intentions…Combined with the stealthy nature of China’s submarine advancements, these developments have promoted some to view the AUKUS alliance as a response rather than the sole impetus for China’s aggressive pursuit of submarine capabilities.”

This speaks to the second concern of some, though not all, Southeast Asian states – that AUKUS will generate an arms race.

The key driver for AUKUS is responding to the rapid growth of Chinese military power, with Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review noting that “China’s military build-up is the largest and most ambitious of any country since the Second World War…This build up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific of China’s strategic intent.”

China’s rapid modernisation of its armed forces, including a rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons capabilities, and its provocative actions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, have led to what the Review notes as “intense China-United States competition” as the “defining feature of our region and time,” with that competition having “the potential to threaten our interests including the potential for conflict.”

In summary, AUKUS Pillar One is designed to strengthen deterrence to prevent war. It is a direct response to China’s rapidly growing military capabilities, and especially its buildup of SSNs, as noted above.

Clearly much of the regional attention has been focused on the acquisition of SSNs for Australia, but the technologies being developed under Pillar Two are equally as important in many respects and could offer more immediate benefits.

Investment into AI and autonomous systems will be crucial for all three AUKUS partners in the face of intense Chinese efforts towards rapid ‘intelligentisation’ of its military through the wide-spread adoption of AI and autonomous systems.

For Australia, and its partners in AUKUS, autonomous systems and AI present some ethical and legal challenges to ensure that these new types of military capabilities, with humans ‘on the loop’ to provide oversight on critical mission aspects, can be employed in a manner consistent with the laws of armed conflict. It is highly unlikely that the AUKUS states would develop fully autonomous systems with humans “off the loop” – with the machine or AI in total control.

Other priority areas in Pillar Two build off autonomy and AI, including advanced undersea warfare capabilities based around networked underwater uncrewed vehicles (UUVs) which can work with the SSNs to defend Australian maritime approaches and sea lanes of communication.

Hypersonics are also vital, leading to missiles and platforms able to strike at long range at very high speeds above five times the speed of sound, thus matching China’s lead in this key capability area. Quantum technologies will allow new types of sensors, communications, and computing capabilities to further strengthen the armed forces of the AUKUS members.

Cyber and electronic warfare open up new domains of operations, as does growing investment in space capabilities for ensuring support of terrestrial forces operating in the air, sea and land domains, and also to counter growing counter-space and anti-satellite systems now emerging from both China and Russia.

As with Pillar One and the acquisition of SSNs under AUKUs, Pillar Two is once again about ensuring credible deterrence is in place against a major power such as China.

The passage of the 2024 NDAA this month by the US Congress highlights that the US recognises the potential capability that AUKUS will open up to Australia, and also as a clear message to the region that AUKUS is serious and here to stay long term.

Most importantly, it confirms that the US, UK and Australia will compete with China rather than cede the strategic environment to Beijing. Their goal is to lead the way in helping protect regional stability. It can be argued that even though this is unlikely to be publicly noted by southeast Asian nations, they should be feeling reassured privately, particularly as they watch China’s ongoing and increasing bullying and harassment in the South China Sea.