Not Europe, Georgia’s future lies in its enduring ties with Türkiye

The last month of the year 2024 saw large civilian protests in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi and unprecedented media coverage of what was framed as “pro-Europe demonstrations” by the West.

As the clock ticked down on Salome Zourabichvili’s six-year term as president of the small nation straddling Europe and Asia, Western commentators piled on the pressure to declare incoming president Mikheil Kavelashvili illegitimate.

Zourabichvili queered the pitch by refusing to step down despite a clear mandate in the elections for the Georgian Dream party.

The US and Britain played their part by sanctioning officials of the Georgia Dream government.

We held our breath for a possible Maidan-style coup d’etat. In the end, Kavelashvili was inaugurated without a hitch, and the foreign media moved on to other stories.

Constitutional reforms

Turning back the clock to December 2018, Zourabichvili’s inauguration as Georgia’s last directly elected president coincided with the entry into force of a new Georgian constitution.

The change was in response to concerns about corruption in Georgian electoral politics since independence in 1991.

The new constitution mandated that the president assume a more ceremonial role and, from 2024, be indirectly elected by a parliamentary college. This is a similar system used in several EU countries, including Germany.

So, Georgia’s constitutional shift to a system of parliamentary democracy was not inconsistent with what happens in most countries of Europe. Nor had Zourabichvili protested this change of constitutional arrangements before the spring of 2024.

The new constitution also included provisions to introduce full proportional representation to elections and electronic voting, which were widely acclaimed at the time by opposition groups.

Fast forward to 2024. Georgia Dream won the October 26 parliamentary elections under this system with 54 percent of votes, while the four fragmented opposition parties together secured 37 percent.

While the OSCE monitoring mission found flaws in several aspects of the election process, they have nonetheless reported that the plebiscite was well organised.

Nevertheless, Zourabichvili led a campaign to encourage non-recognition of the result, and the UK and US, in particular, played their part in supporting her.

Rep Joe Wilson, the Chair of the US-led US Helsinki Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, called on social media for non-recognition of the “Georgian Nightmare”, a trivial reference to the Georgia Dream party.

The Helsinki Commission also called for sanctions against Georgian officials, and on December 19, the US and UK slapped punitive restrictions on five Georgian Interior Ministry officials, including the minister.

On December 27, the US also sanctioned Georgia Dream leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “for undermining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic future of Georgia”.

The European Union revoked visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials.

Initial protests in Tbilisi following the October 26 elections had turned violent, raising fears that events in Tbilisi might mirror the Maiden protest movement in Kiev, which culminated in the coup against then-Ukraine president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014.

The difference in Tbilisi was that the protest movement was aiming to create a unique form of coup in which the serving president of Georgia would remain in office unconstitutionally.

In that regard, Zourabichvili was the worst kind of self-serving political opportunist, using the cloak of allegations of election interference to cling on to political power.

However, the post-election protest movement, while still widespread, subsided to a series of peaceful gatherings and demonstrations that the Georgian police appeared to handle with restraint.

The European and US attempts to sponsor an overthrow of the legitimate government in Tbilisi failed, and we are now in an impasse during which Western governments decide if and how to reset relations.

Why Türkiye matters

The recent events provide ample proof that rather than facing a Euro-Atlantic choice, Georgia should focus on its more enduring partnership closer to home, with Türkiye.

Like Georgia, Türkiye’s troubled road to EU membership has, for now, run out of tarmac.

Although the accession process is officially noted as frozen, I personally doubt that Türkiye will ever be able to join the EU as a fully fledged and equal partner to other member states.

Fundamentally, I have never believed that the predominantly Christian club would want a vibrant Muslim nation like Türkiye to join and, in the process, become the largest EU member by population.

The cost of EU cohesion by allowing Türkiye to join poses a much greater challenge than the cost of absorbing Ukraine, which would break the EU budget.

As for Georgia, the EU’s interest appears far more to be about normative nation-building, which the Georgia Dream party clearly sees as external interference.

The cold truth is, as I have written before, that Georgia has lost out economically following its implementation of a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU in 2016.

As with Ukraine, the EU wants a form of Georgia that may be impossible to deliver, and Georgia wants economic benefits that Europe may be unwilling or unable to provide.

Likewise, the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ path that US lawmakers talk about – a code for future NATO membership - is also a false choice for Georgia.

Having been tipped into a damaging war with Russia in 2008 over its NATO aspiration at that time, it would represent the utmost folly for Georgia’s leaders to revive the idea now.

That doesn’t make Georgia pro-Russian. Georgia still has no diplomatic ties with Russia, and Georgia Dream still wants to reincorporate the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia one day.

Türkiye has taken a balanced and responsible position on Georgian democracy during the post-election period.

By dint of their proximity, Türkiye and Georgia have built an indispensable trade and investment relationship.

While the trade relationship favours Türkiye given its size, with a surplus of $2 billion per year, this is offset in part by Ankara's role as the largest foreign direct investor in Georgia.

This partnership is vital at a time when Türkiye and the neighbouring South Caucasus are more important than ever to European energy security following Russia’s deepening exclusion from EU energy markets.

The southern gas corridor – which runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye – has risen in importance following Ukraine’s decision to cut all Russian piped gas transit to Europe from January 1.

Türkiye and Georgia chose not to mirror EU sanctions against Russia, given the self-evident economic harm this would cause to them by doing so.

While it is an important NATO country, Türkiye has consistently sought a negotiated solution in Ukraine through the February 2022 Istanbul peace talks or its pivotal role in brokering the Black Sea Grain initiative.

The Georgia Dream party has expressed its concerns about the war in Ukraine, having been affected by a huge – given the size of its small population – influx of Russian and Ukrainian draft dodgers and economic nomads since the start of the conflict.

So, across a broad swath of economic, political and security issues, Türkiye and Georgia enjoy a high level of alignment built on the foundations of strong diplomatic relations.

As the Georgia Dream government refocuses on reforming and rebuilding its economy, Türkiye will continue to be a more steadfast and reliable partner than the EU or the US.