How Washington lost its bid to challenge China's influence in Africa

For years, Washington's economic influence in Africa has stalled. Sanctions, low-policy priorities, selective outreach and changing investment volumes have collectively ensured the United States has little financial leverage in the region.

So one shouldn't expect any miracles to come from US President Joe Biden's eleventh-hour visit to Angola, a trip that will mark his first to Africa since his term began in 2021.

The timing of the visit sends a striking message regarding US priorities: Biden will become the first US head of state to visit sub-Saharan Africa in nearly a decade. "The President's visit to Luanda ... underscores the United States' continued commitment to African partners, and demonstrates how collaborating to solve shared challenges delivers for the people of the United States and across the African continent," a White House statement said ahead of the visit.

One of Biden's goals for the trip is to try to contain China's growing economic influence in Angola and beyond. But significant Chinese investments and diverse development offerings suggest Washington lost that chance years ago.

Both countries are jockeying for access to Africa's rare earth mineral supply. China specifically is also interested in utilising Africa's commercial markets and ports, while Washington's goals in the region involve preventing democratic backsliding and sustaining a network of "like-minded" military and trade partnerships.

Investment gaps

Washington has consistently struggled to advance multi-sector investments in Africa.

From industry, agriculture to green investments and energy financing, China continues to prioritise sectors that are central to Africa's future development needs. Platforms such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) have played an important role in aligning Africa's financing needs with China's development support, helping Beijing project itself as a champion of Africa's modernisation.

This is where the Biden administration's economic influence fell short. On the energy front, it pledged millions for renewable energy access in Africa. But the investment volume paled in comparison with the continent's growing energy investment demands.

On the other hand, China has poured billions into green energy projects and sees concessional loans as a way to aid Africa's near-term growth. While Washington has been quick to raise alarm over Chinese debt and lending for years, it has struggled to step up foreign investment flows to debt-stressed African economies, pushing them further into China's orbit.

Political uncertainty has further constrained effective competition with China. Biden is visiting Angola just 40-some days before the election, and there is a real chance that former US President Donald Trump could return to power in November. In the event that this happens, Biden may not be able to deliver on the core of his Africa policy: $55 billion in multisector investments by 2025. About $44 billion of that has been invested so far.

Trump refused to visit Africa during his 2016 term, and has consistently downplayed clean energy financing and diplomatic outreach towards Africa. His message to Africa is clear: it isn’t a foreign policy priority.

China's economic influence meanwhile is free of such constraints. At the FOCAC leaders' summit in Beijing this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed nearly $51 billion in financing for Africa over the next three years, while consistent trade policies ensure China remains Sub-Saharan Africa's top trading partner.

Due to its frequent engagement with 53 African countries, China is also better positioned to see major policy objectives through, such as creating one million new jobs on the continent. Given the sheer scale of Africa's economic engagement with China, Biden needs to do away with the assumption that Beijing's fundamental goal in that region is to weaken "US relations with African peoples and governments."

This perspective reflects a desire to react to China's influence-building in Africa, rather than treat the US-Africa relationship on its own merits.

PGII vs the Belt and Road

Biden's decision to visit Luanda is a calculated move.

Angola is a central part of the Lobito Corridor, a trademark project of the US-backed Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative.

The corridor aims to bolster railway connectivity between Angola's Lobito port, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, and is billed as a counterweight to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa.

However, containment of BRI hasn't paid off. First, Biden has been increasingly selective about which countries to engage under the PGII. His administration has prioritised consultations with Angola, DRC, Tanzania and Zambia, while 52 African nations are actively engaged under the BRI.

In order to advance PGII's regional appeal, Biden must also address Africa's reservations towards Western actions. This includes demands to lift "long-term sanctions" on Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe in a bid to promote their social development.

It would have made sense for Biden to refocus his first Africa trip around nations that feel sidelined by US development priorities. A concrete stand against controversial sanctions is also critical to win more confidence with African Union (AU) states, and assure them that the US is serious about tackling shared challenges "across the African continent."

The AU plays a critical role in shaping regionwide development priorities and economic integration prospects. Washington also depends on it to deepen US-Africa cooperation on economy, food security, health, climate and good governance.

The second constraint for PGII is transcontinental connectivity and energy infrastructure. Both cannot succeed in isolation.

There is a need for Washington to position least-developed African states at the centre of PGII's regional energy and global trade agenda. While the Lobito Corridor envisions international trade and minerals access through Angola's port, it offers limited utility for other African states outside the critical minerals supply chain.

This marks a strategic weakness for PGII, as transport connectivity remains overwhelmingly focused on critical minerals access in Africa. Unless Washington decides to expand competition with the BRI across high-speed railways, port development, multimodal transportation networks, and energy generation infrastructure, it will find it difficult to reshape economic influence in its favour and bring scores of China's strategic partners into its orbit.

Given the limits on US multi-sector investments and infrastructure offerings in Africa, Biden's Angola visit is unlikely to affect Chinese influence-building.

It simply fulfils a long-overdue promise to visit the resource-rich state, where development cooperation remains confined to a handful of African nations.