New Great Game: Why Central Asian countries are pivoting towards Taliban

News published in the Afghan press in recent weeks suggests that some Central Asian countries have taken significant steps towards recognising the Taliban administration in Afghanistan.

According to these reports, three major Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—have already undertaken concrete steps to recognise the Taliban administration and signed important agreements with Kabul.

An August 31 statement quoting Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alibek Bakayev said the country had approved Taliban’s representative as chargé d'affaires of Afghanistan in Astana, while Turkmenistan took a similar step in July.

Earlier in June, Kazakh President Kassym Jomart Tokayev said he had removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organisations to enhance economic relations with Afghanistan.

Similar developments are evident in Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations, with Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Nigmatovich Aripov meeting Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Kabir on August 18.

“Uzbekistan was the first country to establish official relations with the Islamic Emirate, and these relations are currently being maintained on the basis of goodwill and cooperation. Soon, the ambassador of the Islamic Emirate will be received in Tashkent,” Aripov was quoted as saying by Afghanistan’s national TV, emphasising the development of bilateral ties.

Meanwhile, on August 21, Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov told Afghanistan's Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi that Turkmenistan was ready to support Afghanistan on the TAPI project, a natural gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

These developments collectively indicate that Central Asian countries are preparing to officially recognise the Taliban administration and establish normalised relations.

These developments merit the question: What factors led these Asian countries to adopt a favourable approach towards the Taliban administration?

Afghanistan under the Taliban

In the three years since the Taliban reassumed power in Afghanistan, world politics has experienced numerous crises.

However, Afghanistan seems to have experienced relative calm in the absence of any serious opposition, allowing the Taliban the space to institutionalise its grip on power.

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)'s June 2024 assessment report, “although two anti-Taliban resistance groups…have carried out confirmed attacks in the capital, armed opposition in the capital and northern provinces has not posed a significant challenge to the Taliban's territorial control since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021”.

The Taliban's administrative structure is primarily based on a religious and military hierarchy, with its supreme leader, "Amir al Muminin", at its head. The executive, judicial, and legislative branches are structured to emphasise adherence to their interpretation of Islamic law and the leader's directives.

In this structure, administrative roles are allocated to forces loyal to the Taliban, and there has been minimal effort to establish an inclusive administration with the participation of other political and social groups.

An analysis of the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan reveals that the group capitalised on tribalism, an element of nation-state crisis, characterised by a fragmented society and a failed state.

Coupled with favourable international conditions, this allowed the Taliban to regain dominance in Afghanistan without facing significant resistance from society, the state, or foreign actors.

Following its takeover of Kabul, the Taliban swiftly consolidated control over all districts within a day. Once the cabinet was announced by the Islamic Emirate, nearly all other actors were excluded from the power structure, resulting in the Taliban monopolising all sources of power.

It can be contended that the most pressing issue for Afghanistan under Taliban administration is completing the nation-building process and forging national unity.

Even after three years of Taliban-led government, it appears that a constitution representing the social fabric is yet to be enacted.

Foreign policy choices

Over the past three years, the Taliban's foreign policy has centred on economic priorities and fostering peaceful relations with neighbouring countries.

Taliban officials have consistently characterised Afghanistan's foreign policy as economically driven. To demonstrate the seriousness of its economic focus, the Taliban appointed Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a prominent figure and signatory of the Doha Agreement, as deputy prime minister in charge of the economy.

However, the lack of official recognition of the Taliban administration poses a significant barrier to foreign investment and economic engagement with international actors.

Despite this challenge, the Taliban administration has successfully attracted substantial foreign investment over the last three years, amounting to approximately $7 billion, with the majority originating from Chinese investors.

In their statements, Taliban officials frequently emphasise their commitment to maintaining neutrality towards various international actors and their refusal to support militant groups that pose threats to other countries.

It can be argued that the principle of neutrality stands as the Taliban's foremost foreign policy preference. While there is no universally accepted definition of a balanced and neutral foreign policy in international politics, neutrality generally entails avoiding involvement in conflicts, especially those between regional and extra-regional powers.

Additionally, it involves refraining from interference in other countries' internal affairs and ensuring that one's own territory does not serve as a source of security threats to other states.

Thus far, the Taliban leadership has endeavoured, at least on paper, to demonstrate its adherence to these principles.

However, the Taliban’s efforts to enhance its image within the international community and gain recognition from countries and international organisations have been impeded by controversial policies regarding women's education and employment.

Unless these policies are revised, the Taliban's chances of being recognised as a legitimate government by the international community, particularly by Western nations, appear slim.

Central Asia and the ‘New Great Game’

Historically known as the Heartland, Central Asia has become one of the main battlegrounds of the New Great Game between the United States and its main rivals, China and Russia.

In recent years, there has been a strengthening of Central Asia's historical role and its emergence as a key force in the emerging multipolar world. In contrast to the economic stagnation in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region began to experience rapid economic growth in the 2000s.

Integration in Central Asia has led to increased connectivity between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan, as well as the development of rapid economic relations, especially with major neighbours such as China and Russia.

In this context, Afghanistan's geopolitics is a crucial pillar in forming Greater Central Asia and its capacity to play an active role in global politics.

Afghanistan's geography has been a bridge between South and Central Asia for centuries. The geopolitical significance of Afghanistan to Central Asian countries is primarily driven by economic and security considerations. In particular, transit routes, natural resources, and energy diplomacy are key economic factors that enhance Afghanistan's appeal.

Among the most significant transit projects connecting Afghanistan with Central Asia is the construction of railway lines, notably the Five Nations Railway Project, which links China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

This corridor is recognised as a critical transit route from China to Europe. Additionally, Afghanistan is perceived as a transportation corridor connecting Central Asia with Pakistan and India.

Over the past three years, economic cooperation between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan has gained significant momentum. Among these nations, Kazakhstan appears to have adopted an export-oriented foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

An analysis of Kazakhstan's export data to Afghanistan reveals that, despite lacking a common border, Kazakhstan has increased its exports of flour, oil, and wheat to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan's Termez-Hayratan port, reaching a value of up to $987 million.

Kazakhstan's exports account for 90 percent of the bilateral trade, and Kazakhstan remains Afghanistan's primary supplier of flour.

The absence of a security threat from Afghanistan is regarded as a significant advantage for Kazakhstan. Given the lack of a shared border and the absence of a large Pashtun minority or Afghan migrant population in Kazakhstan, the risks associated with such interactions are considerably lower for Kazakhstan compared to countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Consequently, national security has become a secondary priority in Kazakhstan's engagements with Afghanistan, providing Astana with a relative advantage.

Uzbekistan is another Central Asian country that has established strong relations with the Taliban administration.

Though the primary concern for Tashkent is the border threats posed by the presence of Daesh in the region, Uzbekistan's geographical constraints as a double landlocked country—meaning that even its neighbours lack access to open seas—and its complete economic and transportation dependency on neighbouring countries have placed relations with Afghanistan high on its agenda.

Uzbekistan's foreign policy is centred on creating a balance of power against China and gaining access to new markets, particularly India. This policy can potentially attract increased foreign investment and stimulate economic revitalisation in Uzbekistan.

Consequently, Uzbekistan is expanding its relations with the Taliban leadership and is attempting to address security concerns through economic cooperation.

During Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov's visit to Kabul in August, the two countries signed 35 cooperation agreements worth $2.5 billion.

A dozen of these agreements, valued at $1.4 billion, were in the investment sector, while the rest, worth $1.1 billion, pertained to trade.

The completion of the Trans-Afghan railway project, which connects Central Asia and Russia to the warm waters of South Asia via Afghanistan, represents the most significant opportunity for cooperation in Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations.

Among the Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan approaches its engagement with Afghanistan primarily through an economic lens, similar to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Following the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan was one of the first countries to deliver humanitarian aid and successfully established a humanitarian corridor into Afghanistan.

The most significant aspect of their relations is the TAPI project, a crucial component of Turkmenistan's broader strategy to diversify its gas export routes. Most of Turkmenistan's gas pipelines were constructed during the Soviet era and were originally designed to supply gas to Russia.

To date, Turkmenistan has continued selling its gas to Russia's Gazprom; however, Ashgabat has recently sought new partners to enhance its revenue. By exporting gas to Pakistan and India, Turkmenistan has the potential to expand its customer base and boost its gas export revenues. Currently, China remains Turkmenistan's sole gas purchaser.

If the TAPI project is completed and reaches full operational capacity, it would create a significant new energy market for Turkmenistan, with an annual volume of approximately 35 billion cubic meters, equivalent to its exports to China.

Similarly, Kyrgyzstan's primary motivation for recognising the Taliban administration lies in economic and trade relations.

According to recent official statistics, trade volume between Kyrgyzstan and the Taliban administration has increased over the last three years, reaching $50 million.

Among the Central Asian countries, Tajikistan faces the most significant challenges with the Taliban administration.

Since the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has refrained from establishing any political relations with Kabul, making it the only country in the region that does not even recognise the group’s existence.

The Tajik government perceives the Taliban leadership as a direct threat to Tajikistan's national security, thereby adopting a distinct approach compared to other Central Asian nations.

The Tajik government accuses the Taliban of supporting the Tajikistan Jamaat Ansarullah organisation, commonly referred to as the Tajik Taliban. According to official statements from Tajik authorities, the Taliban administration provides refuge, weapons, and financial support to the leaders and members of Jamaat Ansarullah.

Following the onset of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions imposed on Russia, a key strategic shift in the foreign policy of Central Asian countries has been to pivot towards the South and diversify their diplomatic engagements.

For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, their growing engagements with the war-ravaged country are driven by the hope that the Taliban can stabilise Afghanistan.

Because a stable Afghanistan is crucial for peace and stability in the entire region.