Private talks contradict public action: Iran-Israel duplicity

On August 14, 1980, Iran called for an end to oil sales to countries supporting Israel. This came after Iran, fresh out of the 1979 revolution, labelled Israel as the "Little Satan," with the US being the "Great Satan." Almost a year later, on July 18, 1981, an Argentine plane carrying Israeli weapons to Iran crashed near the Soviet-Turkish border. This incident stirred international outrage and highlighted that despite their public hostility, privately Iran and Israel might still share common interests.

In his book "Treacherous Alliance," Trita Parsi explores the secretive dealings between the US, Iran and Israel. Notably, during the Iraq-Iran War, Israel wasn't particularly worried about an Iranian victory since "Iran was a thousand miles away” and “its ability to participate in a war against Israel was minimal.” Quoting David Menashri, one of Israel’s leading experts on Iran, the book states, throughout the 1980s, “no one in Israel said anything about an Iranian threat—the word wasn’t even uttered”.

Moreover, between 1980 and 1983, Iran reportedly bought over $500 million worth of arms from Israel. And in 1989, Israel even resumed buying Iranian oil in a deal aimed at freeing three Israeli prisoners of war in Lebanon.

This common perception of threat against Iraq shared by Iran and Israel, reveals the fact that two hostile states can have clandestine cooperation or mutual benefits, leaving their furious rhetoric occasionally aside. Even though the public animosity between the two states turned into a real conflict last month, they still have common interests and concerns, including managing domestic political narratives, limiting the strength of Palestinian resistance groups, and addressing the growing influence of regional powers like Türkiye.

Domestic political consolidation

In 1979, post-revolution, the relationship between Iran and Israel underwent a radical transformation. Led by Ruhollah Khomeini, the new Iranian regime promptly severed diplomatic ties with Israel. In addition, it established a foreign policy narrative centred on advocating for the Palestinian cause. Key components of this discourse include the naming of one of the Revolutionary Guards' elite units as the Quds Force, the transformation of the former Israeli embassy in Tehran into the Palestinian embassy, the proclamation of Al Quds Day, and the persistent reference to Israel as the "Zionist State," a terminology that remains in use today.

Furthermore, Iran's "Axis of Resistance" discourse - manifest in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq - functions as a pivotal foreign policy strategy on both regional and international levels. Yet, these narratives seem predominantly aimed at strengthening Iranian domestic politics and enhancing national unity. Since the revolution, Iran's continual portrayal of Western imperialism as an existential threat and its self-representation as a beleaguered stronghold of "resistance" serve as crucial tactics for the government. These methods are strategically employed to boost domestic legitimacy and secure widespread public support.

On the other side, Israel's perception of Iran transformed drastically in the same period. While previously the two nations had cooperated strategically, with this cooperation maintained discreetly until the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the new world order led Israel to view Iran as an existential threat. This shift was exacerbated by Iran’s support for Hezbollah and other armed groups in the region as well as its advancing nuclear programme, which was perceived by Israel as a significant and direct threat to its existence.

This “Iranian threat” has also played a significant role in Israeli domestic political discourse. Israeli leaders have often highlighted the Iranian threat to unify public opinion and to gain consensus on security matters.

The rhetoric around the existential dangers posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions and its support for Hezbollah, and Palestinian resistance groups, has been a recurring theme in political campaigns and debates. It’s provided Israeli politicians with a powerful narrative to advocate for strong defence policies and to justify military actions in the region. Namely, the Iranian threat has served as a lens through which various Israeli administrations present as a looming danger to Israel's survival.

Limiting Palestinian empowerment

Despite their fundamentally opposite policies towards the Palestinians, Iran and Israel have a common interest in this matter; limiting the empowerment of the Palestinian resistance groups.

While Iran has been a supporter of groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in order to challenge their mutual adversary Israel, this support is not unconditional and will cease at a point of them becoming fully autonomous or too powerful, potentially diverging from Iran’s geopolitical interests.

During the period of the Arab Uprisings, Iran’s responses were telling.

For instance, in 2012, upon Hamas’s rejection of Iranian demands to provide unconditional support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and moving its headquarters from Damascus to Doha, Iran decided to cut its financial support to Hamas by half. The strain in relations further intensified when then chief of the movement Khaled Meshal called for Hezbollah to withdraw from Syria in 2013, leading to the closure of Hamas offices in Lebanon, and so marking a significant escalation in the tensions between the two. Despite maintaining contacts, tensions have also escalated when the Palestinian group expressed tacit support for the Saudi-led offensive against the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen.

Iran’s relationship with the PIJ had the same fluctuating process. After PIJ’s refusal to endorse the Houthis or to denounce Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen in 2014, Iran again cut funding. The money was even redirected to the now defunct Sabireen movement in Gaza, as an attempt to create a more effective pro-Iranian actor among the Palestinian resistance. These incidents illustrate a pattern of conditional Iranian support based on strategic alignment.

In this period, the limitation to support the Palestinian resistance groups also coincides with Israel's interests. Indeed, during the same period, Israel launched its most intense attacks against these groups, which were characterised by significant military engagement and attempts to curb their military capabilities. In November 2012, Israel launched a war on Gaza and assassinated Ahmed Jabari, a senior Hamas military leader. Two years later in 2014, Israel initiated another war on the Palestinian enclave as the most extensive offensive since the 2008 war.

Rising Türkiye as a challenge

In recent years, Türkiye has emerged as a significant political, economic, and military force within its hinterlands, encompassing the Middle East, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and North Africa. A century after its establishment, the nation is redefining its global stance through pivotal roles in various geopolitical arenas: from its interventions in Libya and critical support in Azerbaijan’s liberating Karabakh from Armenia to mediation efforts in the Ukraine-Russia war. These actions highlight Türkiye's evolving facade as it steps into a new era of influence and capabilities.

Iran, meanwhile, finds itself increasingly marginalised, particularly in Azerbaijan where Türkiye's influence continues to expand. The dynamics in Syria and Iraq have demonstrated to Tehran that any peace process excluding Ankara’s involvement is unlikely to preserve Syria's territorial integrity. This shift in regional power balance underscores a growing geopolitical isolation for Iran, exacerbated by Türkiye's proactive foreign policy moves that challenge Iran's traditional spheres of influence in the region.

On another front, Israel expresses unease with Türkiye's supportive stance towards Palestine and its growing regional influence.

Before the brutal war on Gaza, Tel Aviv realised that Ankara remains the most reasonable option in the cooperation of the East Mediterranean natural gas reserves. Moreover, Israel is acutely aware of Türkiye's undeniable presence in crucial areas like Syria and Palestine. Türkiye's advocacy for a guarantor state model in Palestine poses a direct challenge to Israel, potentially undermining its longstanding occupation there.

This convergence of interests and concerns demonstrates how both Iran and Israel, despite their historical animosities, share a common disquiet regarding Türkiye's rising regional power. In this context, Ankara has undermined the intelligence networks of both nations through operations conducted in recent months. By arresting individuals collaborating with Iranian intelligence or Israel's Mossad, Türkiye has emphasised that it will not tolerate becoming a playground for the intelligence agencies of these two states.