Will Iran opt for course-correction under Pezeshkian or go the old way?

The election of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran's ninth president is being hailed as a seismic political event in the Shia-majority country.

Pezeshkian, who has Turkic roots, secured 53.7 percent of the votes in the second round of the 14th presidential election, which was necessitated by the death of former president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19.

The consequences of Pezeshkian's ascent to the presidency and whether a new era has indeed begun in Iran, as anticipated, are among the critical questions that need to be addressed.

But the first question that begs an answer is: why did the all-powerful Council of Guardians approve Pezeshkian's candidacy?

The Iranian state structure is distinguished by its unique characteristics from those of other countries.

The most significant institutions that differentiate the Iranian state structure are the institution of Vali-e Faqih and the ideological institutions such as the Council of Guardians of the Constitution under this institution.

The Vali-e Faqih, who wields extensive powers ranging from serving as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces to appointing the head of the judiciary, is considered the head of the Iranian state and has consolidated all state power.

According to the Iranian Constitution, the presidency follows the office of Vali-e Faqih, the leader of the revolution, and is primarily responsible for implementing the country's general policies, which are formulated by the Vali-e Faqih and the Islamic Shura Council (Iranian Parliament), as the head of the executive branch.

Significantly, Iranian law stipulates that only candidates approved by the Council of Guardians and whose allegiance to the revolutionary and ideological principles of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic is confirmed can run for the presidency. The council is responsible for verifying this commitment.

In other words, individuals aspiring to become Iran's president can only run for office after passing a rigorous ideological and security vetting process.

A moderate among hardliners?

Despite having the support of reformists, Massoud Pezeshkian is a figure who is not heavily criticised by the establishment of the current political system in Iran.

An examination of Pezeshkian's life reveals that he owes his entry into politics and his ascent within the Iranian bureaucracy primarily to Alireza Marandi, the personal physician of Supreme Leader Khamenei.

This background positions Pezeshkian as a moderate reformist rather than a radical reformist and, hence, is acceptable to moderate conservatives.

Unlike in previous periods, the Guardians Council's approval of Pezeshkian's candidacy this time is tied to the legitimacy crisis faced by the political system.

One of the most crucial functions of elections in Iran is that voter turnout is considered a criterion of legitimacy for the state and the revolutionary ideology.

Indeed, many Iranian officials have periodically urged the public to participate in the elections and demonstrate their adherence to revolutionary principles.

As recently as June 24, Ali Khamenei emphasised the importance of high voter turnout, stating that it would enhance the honour of Iran.

In the 13 presidential elections since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the highest voter turnout was recorded on June 12, 2009. The elections, however, were marred by violence that resulted in many casualties.

The lowest turnout was 48.8 percent in the elections held on June 18, 2021. This discrepancy has sparked debates regarding the legitimacy of the political system.

According to some interpretations, the Guardians Council's approval of Pezeshkian's candidacy, despite his alignment with Turkic-origin reformists, primarily aimed to attract more voters, especially reformist groups and the predominantly Turkic population in northwest Iran.

This strategy was partially successful, as voter turnout in the second round increased to approximately 50 percent.

It can be argued that the Council of Guardians, with the intent of electoral engineering, evaluated Pezeshkian's chances of winning as low. Or believed that even if he won, his moderate profile would prevent serious crises and thus approved his candidacy solely to attract certain voter groups.

However, it is also highly probable that the Council made a significant miscalculation.

In Iran's modern history, the personal psychology and character traits of presidents have always been decisive factors, and this holds true for Pezeshkian as well.

As an outspoken individual, it is highly likely that he will not be a secretive president and will stand firm on his principles.

Pezeshkian’s victory and Iran's domestic politics

With the election of Pezeshkian, executive power has shifted to the moderates and reformists.

This indicates that Iran could experience some relative liberalisation in the political and social spheres. However, given that radical conservatives hold the majority in the Islamic Shura Council, significant conflicts between the government and parliament can be anticipated.

It is foreseeable that the government formed by Pezeshkian will encounter obstacles from the Iranian Parliament as it attempts to introduce and implement various political and social initiatives.

This suggests that political debates in Iran will persist and will manifest in society in a confrontational manner.

During his election campaigns, Pezeshkian emphasised several key civil rights promises, including abolishing the highly controversial morality police, incorporating Sunnis into senior bureaucracy, increasing participation of ethnic identities in political and social spheres, lifting restrictions on internet access, preventing expulsion of students and faculty members from universities due to their political opinions, combating discrimination and injustice, and enhancing participation and role of women in politics.

It is foreseeable that Pezeshkian will attempt to take concrete steps to fulfill these promises. However, a significant issue remains: whether Iran can implement these reforms, given its structural problems.

The history of the last half-century in Iran demonstrates that the country’s state structure has a limited capacity for reform, and presidents have consistently failed to deliver on their promises of reforms.

It is expected that Pezeshkian will face similar challenges.

However, if Pezeshkian persists in pursuing significant reforms, it will invariably manifest in political and social conflicts within Iranian politics and society.

Considering that conservatives dominate Iran's military and security bureaucracy, it can be argued that potential discord between parliament and government carries the risk of escalating into a military and civilian political rivalry and conflict.

This implies that ideological entities such as the Iran's Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) will oppose the government's reformist policies and intervene in politics.

Indeed, in recent years, the IRGC's involvement in politics has repeatedly led to objections from Iranian presidents. A similar scenario is anticipated in Pezekskian's administration.

How will Pezeshkian shape foreign policy?

In Iranian politics, radical conservatives are known for their anti-Western stance and closeness to Russia and China, conservatives for advocating a balanced policy between the Western and Eastern blocs, and reformists for their pro-Western orientation.

The election of a figure like Pezeshkian suggests that proponents of a pro-Western and balanced policy will influence the new Iranian government, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry will be directed by these advocates.

However, the primary issue here is understanding the extent of the power and authority that the Iranian Foreign Ministry holds in shaping Iran's foreign policy.

An analysis of Iran's state structure reveals that in foreign policy, as in domestic policy, the Supreme Leader Khamenei has the final say.

The most important institutions and individuals influencing Khamenei's foreign policy decisions are the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, the Directorate of International Relations in the Office of the Supreme Leader, and the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs come next in terms of importance and effectiveness in policy matters.

Therefore, the expectation that Pezeshkian’s victory will lead to fundamental changes and transformations in Iranian foreign policy is not objective.

However, it does not mean he will remain completely neutral and ineffective. It can be argued that while Iran's foreign policy will structurally continue its anti-Western and "Axis of Resistance" support strategies, it will tactically display a moderate discourse through the Foreign Ministry. This will be most evident in the Iranian nuclear issue.

An analysis of assessments made by media close to the Iranian security bureaucracy regarding the US elections reveals their prediction that Donald Trump would win the US presidential elections.

It was inevitable that relations between the US under a Trump presidency and Iran with a radical conservative figure as president would have been a serious crisis.

With Pezeshkian at the helm, Iran can send positive signals to the West and ensure national unity within the country, albeit to a relative extent.

This also indicates that the stalled nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West could resume after a long hiatus.

For Iranian leaders, the political system of the republic, while being centred on national interests, also possesses a revolutionary character, and the state's survival depends on preserving and perpetuating this revolutionary nature.

The clearest manifestation of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy can be observed in the discourse of the "Axis of Resistance".

According to this discourse, the most crucial factor ensuring Iran's national security consists of the militia organisations that Iran has established or supported across a geographic span extending from India to the Mediterranean.

These militia organisations are Iran's most steadfast allies and represent its principal deterrent tools both regionally and globally. Therefore, the survival and enhancement of Iran, in essence, hinge upon the survival and strengthening of the actors of the Resistance Front operating within the "Axis of Resistance".

Considering the strategic importance of the "Axis of Resistance" discourse in Iran's foreign policy, it is not anticipated that Pezeshkian will bring about a significant change in this area.

Indeed, in his first international contact, Pezeshkian sent a message to Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah in Lebanon, affirming Iran's ongoing full support for Lebanese Hezbollah.

It is expected that this stance of Pezeshkian will continue to extend to actors of the "Axis of Resistance", such as the Ansarullah Movement in Yemen and the Hashd al-Shaabi Organization in Iraq.

While a relative thaw in Iran's relations with the West is predicted during Pezeshkian's presidency, it is unlikely that this lead to fundamental and structural changes.