Can Masoud Pezeshkian transform Iran's domestic and foreign policy?

Masoud Pezeshkian’s election as Iran’s 9th president marks the first reformist leadership to come to power in the country in two decades.

Winning the run-off elections with 53.7 percent of the votes, he defeated the hardliner Saeed Jalili, signalling a shift in the political landscape of a country that has faced internal protests and foreign geopolitical challenges.

Pezeshkian’s extensive political experience includes serving in the Ministry of Health under former President Mohammad Khatami, being the first deputy speaker of the Iranian parliament from 2016 to 2020 and being a parliamentarian representing Tabriz from 2008 to 2024.

Following the historically low 40 percent voter turnout in the election's first round, held on June 28, the run-off elections on July 5 saw a modest increase to 49.8 percent in the turnout.

The abstention of almost 50 percent of eligible voters puts a spotlight on the legitimacy of the Iranian regime and highlights underlying issues facing Iranian society.

The elections demonstrate a trifurcated polarisation within Iranian society. People boycotted the elections due to continuous disenchantment with the regime, conservatives could not consolidate power, and reformists struggled to mobilise their base.

Nevertheless, the election results indicate a public desire to move away from conservative governance.

What needs to be done

Pezeshkian’s election campaign offers insight into his thinking. He touched upon Iran’s pressing domestic and foreign policy issues and proposed measures for transformative change.

Domestically, he was critical of the moral police and pledged to reduce the internet restrictions.

Pezeshkian's opposition to any form of coercion of women and girls is significant. In a TV debate with Saeed Jalili before the run-off elections, he emphasised how his government would counter the morality police.

He also accentuated his opposition to internet restrictions and remarked that the government should develop the infrastructure to provide freedom for internet access.

Moreover, economic challenges, particularly efforts to control inflation and increase purchasing power, will be crucial focus areas for the new government.

Drawing parallels to how Khatami struggled to deal with the principlists-dominated parliament in his final year in office, Pezeshkian will likely need to seek support to implement his modest reforms.

He may also need to compromise to reconcile his policies with the wishes of the parliament, which is dominated by the hardliners.

In terms of foreign policy matters, Pezeshkian aims to depart from his predecessor's approach and aim to be more balanced.

In his comprehensive election campaign, Pezeshkian promised to "extend the hand of friendship to everyone."

Although he promised to make substantive changes to domestic and foreign policy, it is also clear that he does not have unilateral autonomy, particularly for crucial foreign policy decisions.

Instead, he is the executioner of a foreign policy that largely comes from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

In the upcoming days, Pezeshkian will tender his cabinet’s credentials to the Supreme Leader, and it is expected that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs team will involve experienced officials who played vital roles in the nuclear negotiation process.

One of the most essential matters revolves around Iran's shift in foreign policy in this new era, which is characterised by regional tensions.

This policy will seek to improve relations with the West, which has imposed backbreaking sanctions on Tehran. Iranian leadership will try to build constructive relations with the West to lessen its isolation.

However, softened rhetoric must be matched with tangible actions to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The current political conditions in Iran, the US, and Europe differ significantly from those during the time when the original agreement was signed.

Track-one diplomacy will be pivotal in Pezeshkian’s efforts to de-escalate the tensions with the West.

Iran’s new president underscored the necessity of taking constructive steps to restructure relations with Western adversaries and open dialogue channels to remove sanctions.

The key objectives here include resuming nuclear talks, easing the crippling sanctions, and re-engaging with the West, striving to increase Iran's damaged status.

During his campaign, Pezeshkian continuously underlined that confrontation with the West does not resolve Iran's dire economic problems, necessitating a redefined foreign policy. However, the elimination of the sanctions is a significant hurdle to overcome.

Pezeshkian’s government is also expected to maintain ties with Russia, China, and India as part of the Look East policy.

It will look to expand its ties across the global south and be a key actor in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

Additionally, the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia could advance the new government’s goals. However, as experienced during the era of former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, the rapprochement with the West deteriorated relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which should also be noted as an interesting dichotomy.

Another foreign policy challenge will be Iran's regional policies in the Middle East and its relations with proxies, as well as the increased tensions between Iran and Israel.

As expected, Pezeshkian’s influence here is limited, as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the leading practitioner in the field, and the Supreme Leader predominantly shape these policies.

Having said that, Pezeshkian's desire to engage with the West may conflict with the struggles in the Middle East, adding extra complexity to Iran's foreign policy in this new era.

In summary, Pezeshkian's presidency will be a breath of fresh air for Iran's domestic and foreign policy.

Pezeshkian will first and foremost work to bridge the divided Iranian society and foster political pluralism, which has been deepened since the 2017 protests and intensified after Mahsa Amini's death in police custody in 2022.

Uncertainty will remain in foreign policy, particularly regarding the resumption of the nuclear talks, until the US elections in November.

A Republican victory in the US elections will impact the trajectory of Iran's nuclear programme as well as the easing of sanctions.

Nonetheless, Pezeshkian and his foreign policy team are expected to seek initial meetings with US officials during the September United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting in New York, potentially setting the stage for future diplomatic engagements.

Due to the complexity of Iranian politics, it is challenging to project the potential impacts of Pezeshkian's presidency on Iran's political, social, and economic landscape.

However, his commitment to collaborate and reconcile on contentious issues will be crucial to meeting his ambitious vision for Iran. At the same time, several factors determine how his presidency can transform Iranian society and its foreign policy.

The preeminent ones are the coordination between him and the Supreme Leader, his negotiations with the parliament, and the willingness of the West, particularly the US, to initiate diplomatic moves.

If the Supreme Leader and the parliament do not give Pezeshkian enough room to implement his policies, his efforts may remain aspirational.