Behind the veil: Why Iran covertly supports the PKK terrorists?

Amid Ankara's ongoing cross-border operations in Northern Iraq and Syria, Turkish National Defence Minister Yasar Guler stated to a Turkish media channel that despite Turkish authorities sharing locations and addresses of terrorists crossing the border — monitored via UAVs and drones — Iranian authorities are claiming that they are not finding anyone there after investigating these locations.

Tehran’s support for the PKK is nothing new, although it is complicated by the changing balance of power in the region.

The developments in the South Caucasus and Türkiye’s agreement with Iraq to eradicate the terrorist structure in the region, bother Iran, as Tehran continues its covert support for these outfits, despite Ankara’s calls for a clampdown, Hakki Uygur, lecturer at Türkiye’s National Intelligence Academy, tells TRT World.

Experts emphasise that Türkiye’s rising power is not the only concern for Iran. There are other calculations, such as the US’ support for the PKK/YPG in Syria and the presence of other Kurdish opposition groups in the region, with which Iran doesn’t share cordial relations.

While Iran supports the PKK in Iraq against other Kurdish factions, in Syria — where the US exercises more influence on the PKK/YPG terror structure — Tehran has different calculations.

Here is why Iran instrumentalises the PKK against the Turkish state in Iraq, while endeavouring not to lose its access to the Iraqi mountains, where the terror group is nestled.

Iran’s backing of PKK

Since the 1990s, Iran has been in contact with the PKK, as the years correspond to Türkiye’s intensified operations against the terror group in response to its terrorist insurgency.

“During the Turkish operations at the time, we saw that PKK members would retreat to Iran, resettle there and return to Iraq later,” Abdullah Agar tells TRT World. These are the terrorists Türkiye would hit in Qandil or Hakurk, who would then escape to Iran for shelter, he explains.

The PKK could relocate its headquarters from Zap to Qandil, thanks to the efforts of the Quds Force, which is Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It was Qasem Soleimani, the slain commander of the Quds Force, who allowed the PKK to settle in the Qandil mountains that span across Türkiye, Iraq and Iran.

The Sinjar mountain range in Iraq is also populated by these terrorists, as Iran supports them by giving money, weapons, vehicles, spaces to hide, as well as buildings and facilities to settle into, Agar says. More importantly, he says, “The PKK gained legitimacy in Sinjar due to Iran’s efforts.”

The importance of Sinjar lies in the fact that being located near the Iraqi border with Syria, it is used as a logistical corridor connecting PKK’s Syrian offshoots with the Iraqi one.

Confronting the US with/despite the PKK

The American and Iranian support for PKK converge in their common aim of breaking Türkiye’s influence in the region, even though they have their own calculations, Agar says.

Iran’s unique approach lies in the use of the terrorist organisation in areas that benefit them, while putting pressure on them in areas that don't benefit them, Agar adds.

The areas they put pressure on the terrorist structure are Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Hasekeh and Baghuz basins, even as the Central Euphrates basin sees intensified clashes between the PKK and Arab tribes.

That is because “the PKK in Iraq is closer to Iran, while the YPG/PKK in Syria is closer to America”, Agar explains.

Although it is a lose-lose scenario in terms of its relations with Türkiye, Hakki Uygur, lecturer at Türkiye’s National Intelligence Academy, feels “Tehran might also consider a situation, where severing ties would lead the PKK/YPG to align even more with the US, and could be used against its interests.”

Collaborating with PUK over KDP in Iraq

Another aspect of Iran’s collaboration with the terror group and its supporters is to balance the power of different Kurdish factions in Northern Iraq.

By cooperating with Talabani’s PUK which has close ties with the PKK, Tehran is trying to pressure Barzani’s Erbil-based KDP, which has long been against the PKK.

However, the effect of Iran’s backing of PUK is not limited to Northern Iraq, as the Sulaymaniyah region where the PUK is based, is used as a corridor to allow Shia militants to cross into Syria. PUK hosts PKK terrorists coming from Syria and gives them military training. As the complex network of relations are revealed, where the PKK influence in Iraq ends and where its influence in Syria begins get blurred.

One of the facilitators of this network is the terrorist organisation’s chameleon-like structure, Agar says.

The terror group, after failing to adapt to the Turkish conditions, easily adapted to Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian geographies.

Thanks to their adaptability, they now have a very different kind of network, he states, explaining: “When America supports them, they immediately take a different stance. They say, we’re fighting Daesh. When America withdraws support, they immediately turn to Russia. When Russia withdraws support, they turn to Iran.”

The primary goal for the terrorist organisation is survival, leading them to play with different actors very well, he adds.

Against Turkish influence

Over time, the PKK developed relationships with more than 50 countries, says Agar. “We see that they can pursue different interests in different regions. They collaborate with countries that are either competing or in conflict with each other,” he adds.

This way, the PKK is used as a tool both by Iran and the US, despite both having different strategies, Agar says.

“The US uses the PKK for a broader strategy in the Middle East, while Iran uses it more locally, for regional purposes: namely, to pressure the KDP and keep Türkiye in check,” he explains.

This shows a complex form of relationship unique to the Middle East, considering the PKK’s nexus and its supporters.

Hakki Uygur draws attention to how Iran increases its support for the PKK during periods of tensions with Türkiye, referring to developments in the South Caucasus and Türkiye's agreement with Iraq to eradicate the terror corridor.

“The PKK has remained one of the few cards left in the hands of hostile powers against Türkiye, as the country's regional influence deepened over the last decade,” he adds.

Agar explains that for the countries in competition in the region, the strategy is to entrap Türkiye with the PKK, forcing Ankara to allocate forces there and spend time and money.