Can the Lebanese Hezbollah and Amal Movement reunite?

Lebanon stands at a critical juncture in its history amid Israel’s continued assault on the country as well as the ongoing genocidal war in the besieged Palestinian enclave of Gaza.

The long-drawn regional conflicts and the recent assassination of key Hezbollah figures have contributed to a new geopolitical context, intensifying the complexities in both Gaza and Lebanon and significantly diminishing prospects for regional peace.

The question of how the Lebanese conflict—or, more precisely, Israel's sustained assaults and occupation efforts in Lebanon—will conclude hinges primarily on the decisions of Lebanon’s principal political actors and the evolving positions of regional and international powers regarding Israel.

Within this framework, a scenario for potential de-escalation of tensions involves the possible reunification of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement in Lebanon, or at the minimum, the establishment of a united front to facilitate renewed avenues for dialogue.

From armed struggle to political entity

The Amal Movement, a prominent Shia political organisation in Lebanon, was founded in the early 1970s by Musa Sadr to advocate for Lebanese Shia rights and spearhead military resistance against Israel.

Musa Sadr led the movement from its inception, succeeded by Mustafa Chamran and subsequently, in 1979, by Nabih Berri.

During critical events such as the Galilee Operation and Israel's assault on Beirut, Amal, alongside other Lebanese factions, participated in negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the National Salvation Committee.

Since 1990, Amal has been integrated into Lebanon’s political framework, securing parliamentary seats and the speaker’s position in the Lebanese parliament—outcomes of the movement’s recalibrated approach following Musa Sadr’s leadership.

The movement’s origins were shaped by military training and cooperation with Palestinian organisations, producing enduring effects on Lebanon’s political equilibrium.

Amal's initial membership comprised young graduates from the Jabal Amel Industrial School, which provided the movement’s foundational structure through rigorous military training.

Here, members underwent intensive training under Fatah instructors, instilling military discipline and operational structure within the movement.

Since the early 1970s, Lebanon has been mired in political instability, exacerbated by deepening sectarian tensions and a substantial influx of Palestinian refugees.

Intersectarian conflicts, particularly between Lebanon's diverse sectarian communities, culminated in the outbreak of civil war in 1975.

During this period, the Shia community faced a particularly acute security vacuum relative to other sects, prompting community leaders to establish independent military organisations.

Following Israel’s 1978 Litani Operation—an invasion of southern Lebanon—Shia participation in the Amal Movement grew significantly due to the PLO’s inability to shield the local population or counter Israeli influence effectively.

The Lebanese civil war that erupted in 1975 deepened sectarian divisions, and efforts to resolve the conflict culminated in the Taif Agreement of 1990. This accord sought to balance political power more equitably among sects and restore social stability.

Within this newly established political framework, the Amal Movement was integrated into the formal political system, strengthening its legitimacy as a political actor and amplifying its influence in Lebanese society.

In the 1996 parliamentary elections, Amal solidified its power by securing a substantial number of seats, especially in southern Lebanon and Beirut. As a result, Amal transformed into an institution dedicated to upholding the rights and interests of Lebanon's Shiite community.

This broadened role contributed to Amal’s strategic significance within Lebanon’s domestic affairs and its stature in international relations.

Hezbollah and fragmentation of Lebanese Shiism

Amal’s appeal, particularly among young Shias, influenced both Lebanon’s sectarian balance and broader regional dynamics, especially through its connection with the Palestinian resistance.

However, the disappearance of Musa Sadr in 1978 disrupted Amal’s internal coherence and altered its power structure.

This event, coupled with the ideological influence of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, became decisive factors that catalysed Amal’s fragmentation and the eventual emergence of Hezbollah.

Specifically, the Iranian Revolution intensified tensions between Amal's secular and religious factions, while the Israeli invasion in 1982 further polarised these divisions, ultimately leading to Hezbollah's establishment.

This period witnessed an internal schism within Amal between the secular faction, led by Nabih Berri, and the religious faction under Hussein Mussawi, who advocated closer ties with Iran.

This shift was exacerbated by Nabih Berri’s participation in the National Salvation Committee, which included the Lebanese forces—a faction with ties to Israel—intensifying discontent within Amal’s religious faction.

This discord spurred a significant number of Shia youth to rally around Hezbollah, thereby consolidating its power and cementing its role as a dominant force within Lebanese Shiism.

This proximity has fostered both competition and conflict between the two groups. In particular, disparities in personnel recruitment, foreign relations, and positions on the Palestinian cause have intensified this rivalry.

Hezbollah has firmly opposed the recognition of Israel as a state and the establishment of agreements aimed at securing borders, perceiving such actions as a form of capitulation.

These policy differences have eroded mutual trust and instigated a protracted period of conflict.

Ideologically, Hezbollah is aligned with their vision of an Iran-supported theocratic state, while Amal has retained a more secular orientation.

The ensuing schism culminated in a violent rivalry that commenced in mid-1988 and persisted for two-and-a-half years, inflicting substantial costs on both groups and threatening social cohesion, thereby generating tensions within the Shia community in Lebanon.

However, the Gulf Crisis of 1990 transformed regional conditions, leading both factions to seek a mutual peace agreement.

Notably, the collaboration between Hezbollah and Amal during the 33-Day War in the summer of 2006 was pivotal in Lebanon's resistance against Israel.

The formation of the March 8 Coalition in 2005 formalised the collaboration between these two groups within the Lebanese political landscape.

Within this coalition framework, Hezbollah and Amal have successfully secured numerous parliamentary seats and shared ministerial positions, thereby establishing a lasting impact on the Lebanese government.

How to stop Israel's attacks on Lebanon?

According to reports in the international media, Israel has articulated its conditions for pursuing a diplomatic resolution to end its military onslaught in Lebanon, presenting these stipulations to the United States.

It is asserted that the objectives of these conditions primarily revolve around constraining Hezbollah's military capabilities while simultaneously reinforcing Israel's own security measures.

The first of these conditions involves Israel's demand for the right to employ force to prevent the arming of Hezbollah within Lebanese territory.

This demand reflects Israel's concerns regarding Hezbollah's potential rearmament and the fortification of its infrastructure in Southern Lebanon.

The second condition pertains to Israel's request for the right to operate freely within Lebanese airspace, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty.

Through this demand, Israel aims to enhance its capacity to monitor Hezbollah's activities and to conduct military incursions when they deem it necessary.

This request for unrestricted aerial violations serves not only Israel's security interests but also its strategic objective of asserting dominance in the region.

Concurrently, Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces Party and a significant political actor in Lebanon, along with the March 14 Coalition, is advocating for the implementation of international resolutions that mandate the disarmament of resistance movements such as Hezbollah.

Recent statements from Samir Geagea highlight the necessity of disarming the resistance in Lebanon, referencing United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1701, 1680, and 1559.

These resolutions foresee the disbandment of armed groups, particularly Hezbollah, and aim to ensure that the state assumes full control over security matters.

However, a contentious and unresolved issue persists regarding the future of Shia groups in light of the potential elimination of Hezbollah's leadership. For an extended period, Israel has sought to undermine Hezbollah's military and logistical structure by targeting its leadership.

The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah may be perceived as part of a broader strategy to erode Hezbollah's ideological coherence and organisational resilience.

Conversely, Hezbollah is endeavouring to rebuild its strength and credibility in the aftermath of such challenges and aims to demonstrate its power through retaliatory actions against Israel.

In this context, Israel's ultimate goal may involve not only aerial bombardments but also ground invasions that would enable it to gain control over the territory extending to the Litani River. Such manoeuvres would address Israel's long-term expectations concerning regional security dynamics and border integrity.

To prevent the realisation of this scenario, the most advantageous approach would entail reinstating the previous security arrangements based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006.

This would require the limitation of armed groups' activities in the border region of southern Lebanon, ensuring the security of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and facilitating the resumption of diplomatic dialogue.

One of the essential prerequisites for achieving this objective is the restriction of armed Shia groups, which could be facilitated through the consolidation of the groups under the leadership of the Amal Movement.

The historical trajectories of the Amal Movement and Lebanese Hezbollah suggest that the unification of these two movements, while complex, is not an unattainable goal.

Despite the numerous divisions between them, the potential for consolidating Shia groups under a singular umbrella or for Lebanese Hezbollah to align with the Amal Movement is plausible.

This would effectively represent a "Lebanonisation" of the armed Shia groups.