As the United States prepares for its next presidential transition, ties with Türkiye appear to be at a critical juncture.
On the one hand, Trump's presidency balanced cooperation and tension with Ankara, notably allowing Turkish military presence in Syria while taking a more pragmatic, transactional stance on issues like the S-400 purchase. On the other is Kamala Harris, who has been representing US President Joe Biden and his foreign policy agenda as his vice president.
While analysts can readily predict what another Trump term might mean for Türkiye, Harris’s individual approach is less clear.
Yet experts agree that her stance toward Türkiye—a NATO ally—would likely extend President Biden’s policies, which have been marred by persistent disagreements with Ankara.
“If Kamala Harris is elected, she will continue President Biden’s foreign policy toward Türkiye, which has proven mostly critical and problematic,” Dr Isil Acehan from the Türkiye Research Foundation (TAV) tells TRT World.
Throughout his term, Biden did not visit Türkiye once, a snub reciprocated by Erdogan, who avoided the White House during trips to the United States.
Biden’s administration has also enforced Türkiye’s exclusion from the F-35 programme and blocked F-16 procurements, further souring relations.
“Alliances require a shared perspective on key issues, but that is not currently the case for Türkiye and the US, particularly concerning terrorism,” says Furkan Kaya, an associate professor of History at Yeditepe University.
Mirroring red lines?
The PKK is designated a terrorist organisation by both Türkiye and the US, and it has been responsible for over 40,000 deaths in Türkiye over the past four decades. For Ankara, terrorism is a “red line,” a stance that Washington does not fully share when it comes to PKK's Syrian offshoot YPG.
Since the Obama administration, the US has been pushing to legitimise the PKK terrorist organisation’s presence along Türkiye’s southern borders by employing PKK/YPG members in its so-called fight against Daesh.
“The PKK/YPG was used as the US’s proxy in the region, effectively enabling a terrorist stronghold south of Türkiye,” says Kaya, adding that a Harris presidency would likely mirror Obama’s approach.
“They will continue to endorse the PKK/YPG. They are already stating this publicly,” he notes.
Doublespeak on Gaza
Ankara and Washington’s opposite stances on Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza are yet another point of disagreement.
Türkiye has been outspoken against Israeli actions in Gaza, criticising the West for complicity in the deaths of Palestinian civilians.
President Erdogan has repeatedly blamed Israel’s allies, including the US, for supporting Tel Aviv’s war. Israel is facing genocide charges at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for its actions in Gaza, and Türkiye is part of the proceedings.
Meanwhile, Harris, like Biden, has supported a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine and called for humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yet she simultaneously endorsed Israel’s “right to defend itself,” ruling out any arms embargo on Israel.
“Whether Harris or Trump wins doesn’t matter; even their debates focused on who would support Israel more,” Kaya observes.
As long as Washington backs Israel, Türkiye’s regional stance will remain at odds with US policy, he adds.
Tensions in the Mediterranean
US involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean region, particularly its support for Greece, has also fuelled friction with Ankara, its NATO ally.
In recent years, the US has expanded its partnership with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Türkiye seeks to safeguard its territorial waters and support the interests of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a guarantor state.
“From Alexandroupoli (Dedeagac) to Crete, the deployment of American troops in the region in a way that threatens Türkiye must be stopped,” Kaya argues, suggesting that US support for Greece could provoke further escalation if Harris takes office.
Kaya says it’s time for the US to reaffirm its alliance with Türkiye rather than further emboldening Greece.
The Russian roulette
Moreover, experts say Türkiye’s balancing act between the US and Russia could be strained if Harris takes over the White House.
“A Harris administration would likely be more aggressive against Türkiye’s delicate balancing policy with Russia,” says Kaya.
As a NATO member, Türkiye has played a unique mediating role in the Russia-Ukraine war, fostering dialogue between Moscow and Kiev whereas Washington's rivalry with Russia precluded any direct engagement.
However, TAV’s Acehan emphasises Türkiye’s indispensable role within NATO, due to its strategic location and its role in managing migration and conflicts in the Middle East.
“Türkiye is a key NATO ally whose value would be costly to ignore,” she notes. “As a key NATO ally and partner in a variety of sectors, Biden's successor should prioritise strengthening ties with Türkiye,” Acehan says.
She underlines that amid the “devastation caused by conflicts, political turmoil, and instability in nearly all of the Middle East, Türkiye is the most reliable ally in the region.”
A way forward
Despite long-standing tensions, Türkiye appears cautiously optimistic about future relations with the US.
In a recent speech in New York, Erdogan underscored his intent to keep dialogue open with Washington “regardless of who becomes president.” He highlighted a bilateral trade volume of over $30 billion in 2023, hoping to take it to $100 billion within a few years.
Kaya suggests Turkish-American ties might have arrived at a crossroads ahead of the presidential election, with an opening to mend relations that have failed to progress despite Türkiye’s goodwill and adherence to its responsibilities as an ally.
Still, mutual trust requires renewed commitment. “The Biden administration’s unconditional support for Israel and the PKK must come to a full stop,” says Kaya.