What's holding Saudi Arabia back from joining BRICS+?

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the first BRICS+ summit. Representatives of 36 countries, including 22 heads of state, attended this three-day gathering in Kazan, which constituted a challenge to Western efforts to isolate Russia over the Ukraine conflict.

Speaking on the final day of the summit, which was billed as an "outreach" to the Global South, Putin asserted that the participating countries "share similar ambitions, values and a vision for a new democratic world order."

BRICS recently became BRICS+ after the addition of four new members. It was significant that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian, and the United Arab Emirates' President Mohammed bin Zayed attended the summit.

With Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Malaysia having applied for membership in this expanding bloc, their leaders were also present.

However, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was not there. Despite having received an invitation to join BRICS last year, Riyadh has not, at least so far, accepted.

What's holding it back?

Essentially, the kingdom has done a cost-benefit analysis and concluded that, for the time being, it is more prudent to hold off on accepting the BRICS+ invitation.

This is for several reasons, with the most important one being Riyadh's concerns about what joining could mean for Saudi Arabia's relationship with Washington, which has put the kingdom under significant pressure to not accept its BRICS+ invitation.

However, this does not mean that Riyadh is not interested in possibly joining the bloc later, said Dr. Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at the Defence Studies Department of King's College London.

Speaking to TRT World, Krieg said, "I think it's quite clear that the Saudis have quite a lot to gain from (BRICS+) in terms of access to the Global South…in terms of deepening trade relationships, creating some formal underbelly to underwrite and put trade relations on a solid foundation."

BRICS+ offers many future markets for Saudi Arabia, he added.

At the same time, there is much that Saudi Arabia could bring to the BRICS+ table. For starters, the kingdom joining the bloc would significantly increase the percentage of the world’s crude oil produced by BRICS+ members.

Additionally, through its sovereign wealth fund, Saudi Arabia's membership in BRICS+ could open up many investment, trade, and commerce opportunities for the bloc's existing members.

But for now, other overriding factors are keeping Saudi Arabia at bay.

The kingdom's leadership seems to have concluded that at this juncture, the economic benefits of entering the bloc, which presents itself as an alternative to the Western-led order, would probably not outweigh the costs to its partnership with the US.

There is no denying the relevance of great power competition. The kingdom's entry into BRICS+ could risk putting Riyadh under more geopolitical pressure vis-à-vis hostilities between the West and Russia, as well as US-China competition.

Washington could perceive a Saudi entry into the bloc as a major win for China and Russia at the expense of US interests in terms of dollar hegemony and other issues.

Although Saudi Arabia seeks to assert its autonomy on the international stage and diversify its partnerships in an increasingly multipolar world, Riyadh tends to pursue this balancing act with much more caution than Abu Dhabi.

Whereas the UAE can shield itself from much criticism in Washington due to the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia's lack of a normalised relationship with Israel puts it in a different position.

Given the BRICS+ consensus in favour of de-dollarisation, the Saudi leadership is careful on this front. This is probably especially so given the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office in January.

Trump established a record of imposing tariffs on countries during his first term, and has been clear about continuing to do so on nations that move down the de-dollarisation path.

While on the campaign trail last month, the Republican presidential hopeful announced, "You leave the dollar and you're not doing business with the United States because we are going to put a 100 percent tariff on your goods."

Considering that Saudi exports are relatively low, with the kingdom not even being one of the US's top 25 import partners last year, such a tariff might have a limited impact on Riyadh's trade interests.

However, Trump might take other steps to go after countries which move in the de-dollarisation direction, a possibility that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to ignore.

Defence cooperation with the US

Additionally, the US remains Saudi Arabia's top defence partner, supplying the kingdom with 75 percent of its arms. Realistically, neither China nor Russia has the will and capacity to replace the US as Saudi Arabia's security guarantor.

This fact is not lost on Saudi decisionmakers, said Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE.

Speaking to TRT World, he said "The US and Saudi Arabia are enjoying warmer relations as of late, so a delay makes sense as Riyadh gauges how much BRICS can truly benefit Saudi Arabia versus how much it's seeing an improvement with the US. After all, the US is about to restart offensive arms sales to Saudi, something BRICS cannot offer."

Thus, the potential expansion of the US security umbrella, which is a delicate issue that Riyadh and Washington have been negotiating, is a key factor to consider.

"If Saudi Arabia joined BRICS, it would not derail the relationship (with the US)," said Dr. Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House.

"But it would create friction in the relationship and give rise to bureaucratic resistance and ultimately frustrate the Saudi leadership. It would also give those US politicians and media influencers that oppose closer ties with Saudi Arabia, especially the signing of a defence treaty, more reason to raise red flags over the kingdom's loyalty to Washington," he told TRT World.

Unease with Russian foreign policy

Another factor weighing on Saudi Arabia's BRICS+ calculus is its relationship with Russia.

In recent years, the two countries have strengthened bilateral ties across a host of domains. But at the moment, certain aspects of Moscow's foreign policy in the Middle East unsettle Saudi Arabia's leadership.

Perhaps what could be described as growing alignment between Russia and the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance" partly accounts for MBS not being in Kazan last week.

First, there is the deepening military cooperation between Russia and Iran. When it comes to drones, missiles, and possibly later on missile defence and fighter jets, the Saudis have concerns about the support which Moscow and Tehran give each other.

Second, there is, according to some sources, growing Russian support for Yemen's Houthi movement. Due to these pressure points in Saudi-Russian relations, the Saudi leadership is currently not interested in making any "great overtures" to the Kremlin, according to Krieg.

Lots of disagreements

Within BRICS+, there are countries that strongly disagree with each other on many international issues.

Egypt and Ethiopia have their dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. China and India are major geopolitical rivals. Iran and the UAE have a territorial dispute over three islands, ideological friction, and opposing stakes in Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and other conflicts in the Arab region. Iran has also had its differences with Egypt for decades.

Naturally, Saudi Arabia would diverge from other BRICS+ members on important issues if the kingdom enters the bloc.

This leads some analysts to conclude that Riyadh may choose to focus more on enhancing relationships with the countries of the bloc on a bilateral basis. This would be while participating selectively in BRICS+, essentially as a de facto member whose engagement is mostly for symbolic purposes.

For now, doing this might be the Saudi way of continuing to enhance its networks throughout the Global South while minimising the risk of antagonising Washington, which is set to continue perceiving the bloc's expansion as a challenge to US interests.

"Overall, I think Saudi Arabia's interest in BRICS will be largely symbolic rather than substantial, given that it's still heavily reliant on Washington for defence. But should BRICS become a favourable entity by which to export energy, Saudi Arabia's interest would dramatically increase," Bohl concluded.