Why is Iran asking for $30 billion from Syria?

Last week, a statement by Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei about Tehran’s debt to Syria stirred intense speculation and debate across diplomatic circles.

Baghaei remarked that “the new Syrian government will assume all of Syria's financial obligations to Iran” based on the principle of state succession following the fall of Bashar al Assad, a longtime Tehran ally, prompting questions about the future of Tehran’s relationship with Syria’s interim government.

Coupled with his comments on reopening Iran’s embassy in Syria once “the necessary conditions are met,” observers are trying to discern whether Iran’s rhetoric is a prelude to financial claims or a strategic manoeuvre to influence the new government in Damascus.

Iran claims that it has invested considerable amount in the past 12 years to prop up the former regime of Bashar al Assad with some Iranian officials claiming the figure could be more than $30 billion.

However, Baghaei dismissed these claims, stating that “the figures are… truly exaggerated.”

Similar claims of reparations have been made by Iranian officials in the past, most notably in 2020, when reformist former lawmaker Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh demanded that Syria must reimburse Tehran the billions of dollars spent during the war, emphasising that the funds came from public coffers and should be refunded.

Bahram Parsaei, another former member of parliament, echoed similar concerns in a social media post. “What is the fate of this huge amount?” he wrote in a post on December 7, a day before opposition forces entered Damascus.

While some view Tehran’s claims as a legitimate demand for reimbursement, others see them as a tactic to pressure the nascent interim government into negotiating terms favourable to Iranian interests before formal diplomatic ties are established.

“There is no doubt that the new Syrian government will have to take responsibility for all liabilities left behind by the previous Assad regime,” said Omair Anas, assistant professor of international relations at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University.

“However, demanding these dues before the transition fully realised appears to be a message of disapproval regarding the events that led to Assad’s ouster,” he told TRT World, explaining that Iran is likely to establish new terms for repayment once it receives reassuring messages from the new interim government.

Anas suggests that Iran’s claims serve more as a signal to the interim government rather than a genuine expectation of immediate repayment.

However, he also sees an opportunity for Iran to shift its approach.

By seeking “reconciliation and cooperation instead of financial claims,” Tehran could reshape its narrative and foster strategic ties with Syria that are not grounded in sectarian affiliations.

“A non-sectarian bilateral relationship,” he notes, “may help both Iran and Syria face common challenges such as rebuilding Syria, protecting Shia minorities, and resisting Israeli expansionism.”

Can Syria’s interim govt make counterclaims against Iran?

Meanwhile, Abolfazl Zohrevand, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission in the Iranian Parliament, has described Iran’s investments in Syria as a “strategic necessity”.

However, Anas cautions that this rationale is unlikely to resonate with the new administration in Damascus, which has endured years of conflict with Iranian-backed armed groups that supported the Assad regime.

“The new Syrian government abhors Iran,” he said.

He suggests that Syria’s interim government could well consider holding Iran accountable for crimes against the Syrian people.

“I believe Iran has the right to demand $30 billion from the new Syrian government. However, the new Syrian government should, in turn, demand at least $300 billion from Iran for the destruction inflicted on Syrian infrastructure by Iranian-backed armed groups,” he argued.

This adversarial stance, he warned, could escalate into legal confrontations if trials against Assad and his allies proceed in Syrian courts. “Iran must act fast to reconcile,” said Anas, emphasising that diplomatic engagement is crucial to avoiding a prolonged dispute.

Iran's multi-billion gamble on Assad regime

Iran's financial assistance to Syria under the Assad regime has been multifaceted, comprising direct monetary aid, oil shipments, military support, and infrastructure investments. Leaked documents from Iran’s Foreign Ministry revealed that between 2012 and 2021, Iran provided Syria with approximately $11 billion worth of oil, enabling the Assad government to sustain its economy amid a prolonged conflict.

These documents made public last year after the hacktivist group ‘Uprising till Overthrow,’ linked to the Albania-based opposition Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), hacked Iran’s Foreign Ministry website, also indicated that Tehran provided Syria with military and financial support.

Although the exact figures remain contested, this aid reportedly included cash infusions and logistical assistance facilitated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite Quds Force.

Iran's financial aid also took the form of long-term agreements, such as a pivotal arrangement signed in January 2019 under then-President Hassan Rouhani.

This agreement formalised Syria's debt to Iran and included provisions to prevent Tehran’s expulsion from Syria in case of significant political upheaval, such as an assassination or ouster of Assad, which has now come true.

According to the leaked documents, there has been increasing urgency in Tehran to recoup these expenditures, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressing concerns over the security of these investments, drawing parallels with Iran’s diminished influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina despite substantial past investments there.

Iran’s financial support was also aimed at controlling strategic Syrian industries as compensation for its aid. Tehran sought stakes in key sectors, including oil fields, mines, power stations, and port facilities.

However, these assets required significant capital for development—funds that Iran lacked due to its own economic challenges exacerbated by international sanctions. Despite a high-profile visit by then-Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi to Damascus in May 2023, no concrete agreements were reached to secure Iran’s claims.

Legal mechanisms and diplomatic challenges

From a legal standpoint, Iran’s financial claims are grounded in what Anas described as “legally justifiable payments of bilateral trade.”

However, he noted that the current political instability and the interim government’s lack of UN recognition make these claims more of a political statement than a concrete demand.

International mechanisms to resolve such reparation claims—such as arbitration through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or bilateral negotiations—are unlikely to hold firm in this case.

Iran’s decades-long sanctions and contentious relationship with Western powers add another layer of complexity. Simultaneously, the interim government’s precarious status on the global stage further undermines the feasibility of legal redress.

“I don’t think Iran’s demands of financial claims are serious enough,” Anas said, adding that they are temporary expressions of frustration rather than a long-term policy objective.

“At this moment of unprecedented political instability, transition, and uncertainty, Iran’s claims appear to be more of a political and diplomatic statement than a genuine demand for payment.”