Slovakia's Ukraine dilemma: Torn between Russia and the West

Situated along the Danube River is Slovakia's capital, Bratislava. Just a stone's throw from Vienna, Austria, this city of 425,000 people is filled with many Russian and Ukrainian speakers.

Few countries have felt the heat from the Ukraine war as much as landlocked Slovakia, which borders Ukraine. This author recently visited Bratislava to better understand the war's impact on Slovakia and how political elites and average citizens view the 29-month-old conflict next door.

Amid a difficult post-communist transition, Slovakia failed to join NATO in the 1990s when other former Soviet satellite states did so, due to issues pertaining to the country's internal affairs. But by 2004, Slovakia joined both NATO and the European Union.

At that time, a majority of Slovak citizens supported their country's entry into both Western institutions. The commonly-held view was that Slovakia's NATO and EU membership were two sides of the same coin, with security and prosperity set to come hand-in-hand.

Two decades ago, there were no major concerns in Bratislava about NATO's eastward expansion antagonising Russia to the point of triggering a war in Europe. After all, it was a different period in history.

West-Russia relations were not hostile like today and the argument that becoming Washington's close ally would serve Slovakia's interests was convincing amid that unipolar era.

Thus, Russia's war in Ukraine in February 2022 was a major shock. This global crisis highlighted Slovakia's strategic value as a Central European country situated on a major geopolitical faultline, bordering Austria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine, while also exposing Slovakia to the dangers of a war involving Russia coming close to its own territory.

Early on in the Russia-Ukraine war, Washington and Kiev were counting on Slovakia as a critical NATO member in the effort to defeat Moscow. In March and April 2023, Slovakia provided Ukraine with 13 Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets, making it the second NATO member to supply Ukraine with warplanes.

Marked shift

But since Prime Minister Robert Fico returned to power last year after having previously served this position in 2006-10 and 2012-18, the leadership in Bratislava has drastically shifted its rhetoric on Ukraine and Russia.

Slovakia's Foreign Minister Juraj Blanar also met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Türkiye in March—a move that put Bratislava-Prague relations on thin ice.

To understand Slovakia's shift, it is important to recognise that segments of Slovak society have traditionally held pro-Russian attitudes. The current Slovak leadership's stance toward the Ukraine conflict reflects the attitudes of these Moscow-friendly Slovak citizens, while pro-Russian (or anti-Ukrainian) rhetoric from politicians in Bratislava serves domestic political purposes.

A poll conducted in January 2022 showed that 44.1 percent of Slovakia’s population blamed the US and NATO for tensions along the Russian-Ukrainian border, while only 34.7 percent pointed their fingers at Moscow.

Segments of Slovakia's population are Moscow-oriented for different reasons. History, cultural ties, and shared values with their Slavic brethren in Russia inform views of these Slovaks. For others, it is not about loving Russia per se, but more about anti-United States sentiment.

NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 contributed to segments of Slovak society viewing the US as a malign actor, pushing them toward pro-Russian attitudes.

Among many of these Slovaks who are outright supportive of Russia, or at least sympathetic to Moscow, there are concerns about Slovakia's sovereignty eroding with their country becoming a de facto US "colony." Fico's talk of a "sovereign Slovak foreign policy" sits well with these constituents.

Balancing act

Fico's coalition consists of three parties - his own Smer (Direction) party, the leftist Hlas (Voice) party, and the pro-Russian Slovak National Party (SNS).

On the far-right of Slovakia's political spectrum, the SNS fully endorses the Kremlin's talking points about Ukrainian "Nazis" and Russia waging war in 2022 for defensive purposes.

Figures within this party believe that the leadership in Bratislava should go to Moscow and apologise for Slovakia's previous military support for Ukraine.

Although most Slovak citizens don't agree with such positions, the SNS is no fringe group. It has real power within the ruling coalition. Ultimately, Fico is a pragmatist who, for political purposes, caters to voters supporting the SNS.

Slovakia is one of Europe's most politically polarised countries and the Ukraine conflict is one reason why. While segments of the society have views favourable to Russia, other parts of the population want Bratislava to align closely with its NATO allies behind Ukraine.

In May, there was an assassination attempt on Fico, which, according to the prime minister himself, was a result of his stance toward Ukraine, which sits outside the European mainstream.

Interestingly, however, no one with any real influence in Bratislava has called for Slovakia's exit from either the EU or NATO. Even Slovakia's most Russia-oriented politicians see Slovakia's interests best served by keeping their country in the Transatlantic Alliance.

Fico and his allies advocate continued Slovak membership in NATO but want their country to assert its autonomy from its Western allies. These figures want Slovakia to take an independent stance vis-à-vis the Ukraine war which takes stock of Slovakia's perceived national interests.

This is extremely similar to how the government led by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban views its NATO membership and Budapest's relations with Moscow and Kiev.

Sick of war

It's popular for politicians in Bratislava to talk about peace in Ukraine. For understandable reasons, essentially everyone in Slovakia wants this war to be over. Yet, there are intense debates among Slovaks about how to conceptualise peace in the context of the ongoing Ukraine war.

Like Orban, Fico and his supporters maintain that the West's strategy of arming Ukraine in pursuit of a military defeat of Russia is dangerous. They see no viable pathway to a Ukrainian military victory.

In their eyes, peace requires negotiating a ceasefire and making territorial compromises with Moscow, which permit Russia to maintain control of a percentage of land in Ukraine's UN-recognised borders.

But others in Slovakia find this naïve and argue that Moscow can't be trusted to abide by a ceasefire. They say that such territorial concessions will only invite more Russian aggression toward European countries down the line.

Ambiguities

Understanding the nuances of Bratislava's positions vis-à-vis the Ukraine war requires distinguishing between word and deed while recognising contradictions.

Fico came back to power last year after campaigning on his "not another bullet" for Ukraine pledge. However, Slovakia's parliament backed an amendment to the Competence Law in January that permits the country's defence ministry to green-light weapons exports which opened the door to public and private arms companies to continue arming Kiev.

Put simply, Fico's campaign promise last year is at odds with the business-as-usual approach that Bratislava currently embraces toward the war next door.

Another example worth noting is the July 2024 NATO summit in Washington. Slovakia signed the summit's declaration.

But Fico, who did not attend, issued a stark warning in a Facebook video shortly after the gathering which contradicted that declaration. Whereas the Washington Summit Declaration bolstered the Western Alliance's commitment to the "irreversible path" toward Ukrainian membership, Fico warned that "Ukraine's membership in NATO is just a guarantee of World War III."

In sum, Fico and members of his coalition issue rhetoric that harshly criticises the West's policies vis-à-vis Ukraine. Yet, in practice, Slovakia's government is not doing anything to obstruct the EU and NATO's support for Kiev.

A key question is, are these contradictions in Bratislava's foreign policy toward the Ukraine war sustainable, or will something eventually have to give?