Why the Taliban ignores Pakistan's demands to take action against the TTP

Since coming to power last August, the Taliban's acting regime has been ignoring Pakistan’s demands to rein in the Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Not just that, the Taliban have also turned a blind eye to TTP’s unabated attacks against Pakistan. For instance, on January 6, TTP militants ambushed and killed five Pakistani soldiers on the Pak-Afghan border along the Khurram tribal district. 

Following this attack, the statement from Pakistan Army’s media wing, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), underscored Islamabad’s growing frustration with the Taliban’s unwillingness to stop TTP from using the Afghan soil for terrorism against Pakistan despite verbal commitments to the contrary.

Likewise, in late December and early January, the Taliban disrupted the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border, also known as the Durand Line, along the eastern Nangarhar and northeastern Nimroz provinces. In one instance, Pakistani troops and the Taliban fighters came face to face as well.

Since 2017, Islamabad has fenced 90 percent of its roughly 2,600-kilometre-long porous border with Afghanistan to stop terrorist infiltration and smuggling. Like all previous Afghan governments, the Taliban do not recognise the Pak-Afghan border. From the Taliban standpoint, the Durand Line is a relic of the British colonial era, which divided the ethnic Pashtun community straddling the border region.

Though many considered the revival of the Taliban’s self-styled theocratic rule in Afghanistan a strategic win for Pakistan, it has created serious security, political and economic challenges for the country. The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan had a rejuvenating effect on TTP and provided the militant group with greater operational freedom and mobility.

The Taliban have been non-committal on the issue of the TTP, beyond giving generic assurances to Islamabad that Afghanistan's soil will not be used against any other country and urging it to settle its disputes with TTP through negotiations.

Following the revival of the Taliban rule, Pakistan handed over a list of wanted TTP leaders to the Taliban. Though the Taliban formed a three-member committee to probe the veracity of the Pakistani security concerns, their response was rather tame. Last August, the Taliban's Information and Cultural Minister Zabiullah Mujahid told a Pakistani News channel that "Pakistan, not the Taliban, need to decide whether or not TTP's war is legitimate and to formulate a strategy in response."

Probably, the Taliban’s unwillingness to crackdown, expel or disarm TTP from its Afghan sanctuaries has compelled Pakistan to retaliate covertly. The recent assassination attempts at different TTP leaders in Afghanistan should be seen in that context. For instance, on December 17, TTP’s deputy chief Faqir Muhammad narrowly escaped a drone attack, as the missiles failed to explode. Similarly, in January two TTP leaders Khalid Balti and Mufti Burjan were eliminated in Kunar in two separate incidents.

From November 9 to December 9, the Taliban brokered a ceasefire between Pakistan and the TTP as a confidence building measure to pave the way for a broader peace deal. However, the negotiations collapsed given the inherent lack of trust and divergent positions of both conflicting parties. The TTP wanted imposition of Taliban-style Sharia rule in the ex-FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region, the release of 100 Taliban prisoners and the permission to open a political office in a third country as pre-conditions.

Islamabad, on the contrary, wanted TTP to renounce violence, offer a public apology for its past violence, respect the Pakistani constitution and live like normal citizens to avail indemnity. Following the collapse of peace talks, TTP attacks against Pakistan increased dramatically. For instance, in December, TTP carried out as many as 45 terrorist attacks, the most for any month in 2020.

On the one hand, the Taliban's reluctance to act against TTP highlights their longstanding and deep-rooted ties to the militant group. On the other hand, the Taliban's open defiance and opposition to the Pak-Afghan border's fencing and ignoring Islamabad's TTP-centric demands underscore the shifting nature of their relations with Pakistan. Arguably, Taliban fighters intentionally provoked Pakistan through border flare-ups to divert attention from Pakistani demands of action against TTP.

Since 2018, the Taliban's dependence on Pakistan has continuously diminished given the movement's rapid territorial gains in Afghanistan, diversified diplomatic ties with other countries through their Doha Office, and direct negotiations with the US.

However, the Taliban were still reliant on Pakistan for sanctuaries, medical assistance and weapons. This dependence ended last August as the Taliban took over Kabul, giving the group more autonomy and freedom of action.

It is essential to point out that the Taliban still rely on Islamabad as a bridge to avail international humanitarian assistance. For instance, Pakistan hosted a special summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to draw the Muslim world's attention in a bid to avert the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.  

Reluctance to take action

The Taliban’s disinclination to crackdown against TTP on Pakistan’s insistence stems from the following three reasons.

First, the Taliban have long standing historical, ethnic, and ideological links with the TTP. Its leaders and fighters consider the Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada as their emir and pledge their oath of allegiance to him. TTP was one of the first groups which congratulated the Taliban on their victory in Afghanistan and renewed their oath of loyalty to the Taliban emir.

The TTP considers the revival of the Taliban’s so-called Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan a goal worthy of emulating in Pakistan.

The TTP, like Al Qaeda, was also instrumental in helping the Taliban revive their insurgency and eventually attain a victory in Afghanistan. After the restoration of their power in Afghanistan, the Taliban are returning the favour by sheltering TTP and they are unlikely to betray their ideological brethren.

If the Taliban act against TTP, it would push the latter towards the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), the former’s ideological nemesis. Any such action is likely to widen the Taliban’s factional divisions, undermining their internal unity and cohesion which they badly need to retain power.  

Importantly, the Taliban’s reluctance to act against TTP is instructive concerning the group's counterterrorism commitments given to the US under the Doha Agreement. If the Taliban are ignoring the demands of Pakistan, its main benefactor for the last two decades, then the Taliban’s guarantees to other states, which have less leverage on them, are unreliable.

Second, so far, no country has granted diplomatic recognition to the Taliban’s acting regime. This compels the Taliban to retain their ideological legitimacy and credibility within the fraternity of ideologically-linked movements. Turning on fellow groups, which sheltered the Taliban during testing times and helped them achieve victory, will amount to an act of great betrayal.

Partly, Islamabad’s reluctance to recognise the Taliban’s acting regime also accounts for growing Pakistan-Taliban tensions. The Taliban seems frustrated at its failure to get diplomatic recognition. The Taliban believe they have fulfilled the international community’s demands and it is their right to gain recognition which will also pave the way for unlocking $9.5 billion in frozen Afghan assets. On January 19, the Taliban urged the Muslim world to take lead in recognising their regime.  

Third, lacking international diplomatic recognition, the Taliban are desperately trying to win local sympathies, particularly among Afghanistan’s Pashtun community. By not recognising the Pak-Afghan border and physically obstructing its fencing, the Taliban are positioning themselves to be the self-appointed champions of Pashtun rights.

In this regard, the Taliban deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai's January 6 statement is worth noting. He maintained, "the Durand Line is an issue of the whole nation, not the government. It doesn't belong to the government. We will give the responsibility to the nation so that the nation will make the decision."

Keeping this in view, the TTP is an important bargaining chip for the Taliban – it provides the Taliban with tremendous strategic leverage against Pakistan.

In 2022, TTP will remain a major threat to Pakistan’s internal security, which will negatively impact already strained Taliban-Pakistan ties. However, beyond token demands for action against TTP, Islamabad cannot afford to alienate the Taliban.

A weakened and factionalised Taliban regime would strengthen the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan such as the National Resistance Force led by exiled Ahmed Massoud, the son of legendary Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, which is a recipe for a civil war. Such a development would send a massive wave of Afghan refugees to Pakistan.

Pakistan will continue to press the Taliban to act against the TTP without taking any dramatic steps or alienating the Taliban’s acting regime. The trade-off between dealing with TTP’s terrorist attacks from their Afghan sanctuaries versus the prospects of a weakened Taliban regime makes it obvious that Pakistan will have live with the existing status quo.